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GOD AND GUNS: THE FREE EXERCISE OF 
RELIGION PROBLEMS OF REGULATING 
GUNS IN CHURCHES AND OTHER 
HOUSES OF WORSHIP 
JOHN M.A. DIPIPPA 
This Article demonstrates that the cases raising religious liberty 
challenges to state regulation of weapons in houses of worship reveal the 
persistent problems plaguing religious liberty cases.  First, these cases 
illustrate the difficulties non-mainstream religious claims face.  Courts 
may not understand the religious nature of the claim or they may devalue 
claims that do not seem “normal” or “reasonable.”  This is compounded 
by how few religious liberty claimants, especially non-mainstream 
religions, win their cases.  Second, the cases are part of the larger debate 
about how easy it should be to get judicially imposed religious exemptions 
from general and neutral laws.  Uncritically granting exemptions could 
undermine the statutory scheme and the rule of law.  Too stingy an 
approach and religious freedom becomes an empty promise.  Third, the 
cases show the problems with a neutral approach.  Neutrality is often held 
out as the appropriate touchstone for religious liberty analysis.  Finding a 
neutral standpoint, however, is difficult, if not impossible, especially when 
dealing with religion.  This difficulty forces courts to find “neutrality” by 
silently relying on their background assumptions about religion, which 
only exacerbates the problems of non-mainstream claimants.  These three 
difficulties have relevance to the current litigation concerning the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
This Article concludes that these persistent problems flow from the 
ambiguity about religious liberty’s purpose.  Adopting one or another 
perspective dictates the paths that courts take in religious liberty cases. 
 
  Dean Emeritus and Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy, University of 
Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law.  A summer research grant 
supported the work on this Article.  Thanks to Leslie Copeland and Joyce Olajumoke Ajayi 
who provided expert research assistance and advice when I needed it the most and to Terri 
Beiner, Associate Dean for Faculty Development, who gently but persistently encouraged me 
to return to my scholarship after years of mind numbing work as a law school administrator.  
Thanks also to my colleagues who attended a faculty development lunch where they heard a 
much rougher version of this piece. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, the Arkansas General Assembly allowed people to take 
guns into places of worship.1  Representatives of religious congregations 
offered differing testimony on the need for the bill.2  Some legislators 
were concerned that a categorical prohibition violated religious liberty.3  
 
1.  Act of Feb. 11, 2013, Act 67, § 1, 2013 Ark. Acts 273, 274 (codified as amended at 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-306(16) (Supp. 2013)).  Prior law categorically exempted churches.  
Id. § 5-73-306(17) (1997).  The new statute continues this categorical exemption but “does not 
preclude a church or other place of worship from determining who may carry a concealed 
handgun into the church or other place of worship.”  Id. § 5-73-306(16)(B) (Supp. 2013).  This 
issue came up in the 2011 legislative session during which I was asked for my opinion on the 
free exercise implications of the former categorical exemption for churches.  See Lee Hogan, 
Beebe Signs Guns in Church Bill into Law, ARK. ONLINE  (Feb. 11, 2013, 1:26 PM),  http://ww
w.arkansasonline.com/news/2013/feb/11/gov-beebe-signs-guns-church-bill-law/, archived at htt
p://perma.cc/B2MW-7BH4.  
2.  See Sean Beherec, Michael R. Wickline & Sarah D. Wire, Church Leaders Give 
Views on Guns in Sanctuaries, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Feb. 1, 2013, at 8A. 
3.  See Letter from Dustin McDaniel, Attorney Gen., to Beverly Pyle, Ark. State 
Legislature Representative (Sept. 29, 2009).  Representative Pyle, the requestor, also asked 
for my opinion.  See letter on file with author.  The legislation included an “Emergency 
Clause” declaring that  
personal security is increasingly important; that the Second Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States ensures a person’s right to bear arms; and that this 
act is immediately necessary because a person should be allowed to carry a firearm 
in a church that permits the carrying of a firearm for personal security. 
Act 67, § 2, 2013 Ark. Acts at 274.  So-called “emergency clauses” are routinely added to 
legislation to allow laws to go into effect immediately.  Opponents of the change offered 
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This argument was similar to the one made by Georgia churches that 
sued the state over its categorical prohibition on guns in churches.4  On 
the other hand, Minnesota churches sued the state when that state 
changed the law to allow guns in houses of worship.5 
This correlation of guns and religion raises a number of interesting, 
non-trivial questions about the application of First Amendment law and 
the nature of religious liberty.  This Article will explore some of those 
questions.6 
II. BASIC GUN CONTROL MEASURES AND HOUSES OF WORSHIP 
Gun control measures revolve around two basic issues: who should 
be allowed to carry a gun and where those guns should be allowed to be 
carried.7  The first focuses on how easy it should be to carry guns and 
who should be allowed to carry them.8  The second focuses on where 
those guns should be allowed.9 
 
explicitly religious arguments for continuing the ban during a previous attempt to amend the 
bill.  See Charlie Frago & Michael R. Wickline, House Passes Gun-in-Church Bill, ARK. 
DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Feb. 12, 2009, at A10. 
4.  See GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 856 (2013). 
5.  See Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 198 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2008). 
6.  The Second Amendment implications of categorical gun bans in sensitive places are 
beyond the scope of this Article.  There is an extensive and growing body of scholarship on 
Second Amendment issues.  See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and 
Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 1443 (2009). 
7.  This follows Heller’s reminder that Second Amendment rights are not absolute and 
its brief list of permissible categories of regulations.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570, 626–27 (2008) (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding 
the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings . . . .”); 
see also Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms Outside of the Home: Separating Historical 
Myths from Historical Realities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695, 1719 n.132 (2012) (citing 
nineteenth-century statutes banning guns in sensitive places). 
8.  Some states allow gun holders to carry their guns openly.  Open Carry, 
OPENCARRY.ORG, http://www.opencarry.org/?page_id=103 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/PX9P-FFG8 (labeling Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, Idaho, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota, 
Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming as “Gold Star” open carry states, and labeling Florida, 
Illinois, New York, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington D.C. as “Non Permissive” open-
carry states).  Other states require gun owners to conceal their guns when in public.  Id.; see 
also Ginny Fahs, Illinois Is 50th State to Legalize Carrying Concealed Weapons, NPR (July 10, 
2013, 2:10 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/the-two-way/2013/07/10/200789406/Illinois-is-50th-st
ate-to-legalize-carrying-concealed-weapons, archived at http://perma.cc/V6NJ-8ZKS 
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One rationale is that although carrying weapons in public may be 
helpful for individual self-defense, that justification breaks down in large 
public gatherings.10  Most people will be unarmed and crowded into a 
confined space.  Even one person with a gun may cause considerable 
injury before being stopped.  Moreover, an exchange of gunfire between 
the “good guys” and the “bad guys” may be just as dangerous as a lone 
gunman.11  Another rationale is that some places are incompatible with 
weapons.  Schools, courthouses, government buildings, and legislative 
chambers are places where either vulnerable populations are housed 
(like schools) or where public business is conducted.  The use or threat 
of force is incompatible with this property’s function.  Finally, some 
“sensitive places” provide security by screening people who enter, thus 
obviating the need for an individual to be armed for self-defense.12  
Houses of worship share some but not all of the characteristics of each 
of these categories.13 
 
(reporting that all fifty states now have provisions for concealed carrying of weapons).  Some 
states require officials to issue permits if applicants meet certain threshold requirements.  See 
Steven W. Kranz, Comment, A Survey of State Conceal and Carry Statutes: Can Small 
Changes Help Reduce the Controversy?, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 637, 670–708 (2006) (listing 35 
states in the Appendix as “shall-issue” states).  Embedded into these processes is the question 
of who, if anyone, should not be allowed to carry a gun.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (2012) 
(prohibiting the sale or disposition of firearms to felons, fugitives, illegal aliens, and domestic 
violence offenders, among others); id. § 922(x)(2) (prohibiting juveniles from possessing a 
handgun or handgun ammunition).  
9.  Volokh, supra note 6, at 1515 (“Many laws prohibit most people from possessing 
guns in certain places, such as on all public streets, in bars, in parks, and in public housing 
projects.”). 
10.  See, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated on other 
grounds, 611 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding ban on possession of firearms in “open air” 
places “because possessing firearms in such places risks harm to great numbers of defenseless 
people (e.g., children)”). 
11.  See Nordyke, 563 F.3d at 459 (ruling against open carry and, for that matter, carry 
laws).  The Supreme Court recently declined to hear three cases challenging gun laws, giving 
rise to the inference that states may proscribe gun possession in certain places.  Lawrence 
Hurley, Supreme Court Declines Challenges to Gun Laws, REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2014, 10:00 
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/24/us-usa-court-guns-idUSBREA1N1282014022
4, archived at http://perma.cc/KD3A-9TJM.  
12.  Brian C. Whitman, In Defense of Self-Defense: Heller’s Second Amendment in 
Sensitive Places, 81 MISS. L.J. 1987, 1989–90 (2012). 
13.  Id. at 2007–08 (calling gun bans in houses of worship an “obvious violation” of the 
Second Amendment).  Colleges and universities are often included in these lists, too.  Id. at 
2006–07.  The constitutionality of gun bans on campus is fiercely contested.  Compare Joan H. 
Miller, Comment, The Second Amendment Goes to College, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 235 
(2011) (arguing that broad gun bans are constitutional), with Brian Miller, Legal Experts: 
Campus Gun Bans Flawed, Unconstitutional, COLLEGE FIX (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.thecol
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Other states permit holders to carry guns anywhere but allow 
property owners to ban weapons on their property by posting notices or 
using other methods to notify permit holders.14  In opt-out jurisdictions, 
permit holders can carry guns into houses of worship unless the 
organization posts notices declaring its property a gun-free zone.15  
Churches and other houses of worship have argued that requiring them 
to post opt-out notices violated their religious beliefs in peace and in 
offering worshipers a safe and inclusive sanctuary.16  In the categorical 
jurisdictions, churches have argued that the total ban violates their 
religious freedom.17  They believe that it is “right and just” for their 
members to attend services armed and the state cannot interfere with 
this belief and action.18 
These claims raise questions about the nature of religious freedom in 
today’s world as well as the adequacy of current First Amendment law.19  
One might be suspicious of claims that “God requires us to bring our 
weapons to church,” but claiming a divine command to be armed is not 
unprecedented.20  Sikhs have long made this exact claim.21  Modern-day 
 
legefix.com/post/12393/, archived at http://perma.cc/8UV6-8ZXT (reporting that some 
professors suggest that “[s]ome campus firearms regulations” may violate student and 
employee rights under the Constitution).  See generally David B. Kopel, Pretend “Gun-Free” 
School Zones: A Deadly Legal Fiction, 42 CONN. L. REV. 515 (2009); Brian J. Siebel, The 
Case Against Guns on Campus, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 319 (2008); Lewis M. 
Wasserman, Gun Control on College and University Campuses in the Wake of District of 
Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 55 (2011) 
(stating that “thoughtfully adopt[ed]” gun bans based on scientific research are consistent 
with Heller, and McDonald restrictions are probably constitutional). 
14.  ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-73-306(19)(A)(i) (1997 & Supp. 2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 237.110(17) (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(17)(a) (West 
2009 & Supp. 2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101(13) (2011 & Supp. 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 571.107(1)(15) (West 2011 & Supp. 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-19-12(C) (LexisNexis 
2013); id. § 30-14-6(A)(B) (LexisNexis 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.11(c)(8) (2011); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.12.6(C)(3) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2014); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 21, § 1290.22(C) (West Supp. 2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-220(2) (2007); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-17-1359(a)–(b) (2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.06(b) (West 2011).  I 
will refer to these states, collectively, as “opt-out jurisdictions.” 
15.  See Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. Minnesota, 745 N.W.2d 194, 202 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2008). 
16.  Id. at 199–202. 
17.  See GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012). 
18.  See id. at 1249 n.8. 
19.  See Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: The 
History, the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222 (2003) [hereinafter Feldman, 
Religious Minorities]. 
20.  See David B. Kopel, Evolving Christian Attitudes Towards Personal and National 
Self-Defense, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1709 (2013) [hereinafter Kopel, Evolving Attitudes]; David B. 
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Christians, on the other hand, must infer such a duty.22  The result could 
be a corruption of religion with the latest political cause.23  At the same 
time, this very suspicion should make us wary.  It is an enduring 
problem of free exercise law that we will tolerate the religious claims 
that seem most reasonable because they seem “normal.”24 
Current First Amendment law cannot coherently address these 
different situations.  In the categorical jurisdictions, the claims will 
founder on whether or not the law actually burdens a religious belief 
because the religious claim collapses into the secular preference to be 
armed.25  Yet the categorical exclusion of places of worship singles them 
out for exceptional treatment and includes them with other areas that 
may have little in common with places of worship.26  In the opt-out 
jurisdictions, the claim will founder because, although it may be easier 
for a court to see a religious burden, the laws will be neutral and 
generally applicable.27  They do not single out religion.  Rather, they 
allow churches to opt out by following exactly the same procedures as 
any other property owner.28  Yet this seems to demean the religious 
nature of the claim—providing sanctuary—and reduces it, once again, 
to a matter of personal preference.  
In both instances, the religious nature of the claim confounds the 
analysis.  Courts devalue the religious nature of the claim when they 
privilege mainstream or “normal” religious claims.29  At the same time, 
religious adherents must tame or sanitize their claim for it to be 
 
Kopel, The Religious Roots of the American Revolution and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 
17 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 167 (2005) [hereinafter Kopel, Religious Roots]. 
21.  See Michael Baker, Security and the Sacred: Examining Canada’s Legal Response to 
the Clash of Public Safety and Religious Freedom, 13 TOURO INT’L L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2010). 
22.  See Kopel, -0tudes, supra note 20.  
23.  See id.  
24.  See infra Part VII.A. 
25.  See infra text accompanying notes 74–81; see also Blake Farmer, Kentucky Southern 
Baptists Draw Crowds With Gun Giveaways, NPR (Mar. 10, 2014, 3:02 AM), http://www.npr.o
rg/2014/03/10/287311237/Kentucky-southern-baptists-draw-crowds-with-gun-giveaways?utm_
medium=Email&utm_source=share&utm_campaign=storyshare, archived at http://perma.cc/6
KAV-28PZ. 
26.  Examples include legislative buildings or public parks.  See, e.g., GeorgiaCarry.org, 
Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012) 
27.  See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (stating that laws must be neutral and 
generally applicable). 
28.  See supra note 14. 
29.  See infra Part VII.A. 
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understood and accepted by courts.30  This has relevance for other free 
exercise claims.  Indeed, it is one of the most problematic aspects of free 
exercise law.31  If courts too easily grant religious exemptions, the rule of 
law is undermined.32  On the other hand, unless courts remain open to 
“unusual” religious claims, free exercise law is a tautology: the only 
religious practices we protect are the ones we already practice.  
III. THE TWO CASES RAISING ISSUES OF  
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND GUNS 
In 2005, the Minnesota legislature passed the Minnesota Citizens’ 
Personal Protection Act.33  The act made Minnesota a “shall issue” state 
with regard to permits to carry a handgun and changed Minnesota law 
with regard to the right to carry and possess a gun on private property 
within the state.34  The Minnesota act allowed private establishments to 
prohibit the possession of guns on their property by posting notices with 
statutorily mandated language.35  At the same time, it prohibited private 
establishments from banning guns in their parking lots and prevented 
these establishments from barring their tenants’ possession of guns on 
their rented property.36  Places of worship fell within the definition of 
private establishment and, like other private establishments, had to post 
“no gun” notices to prevent possession inside the church or in their 
rented space.37  
 
30.  See infra notes 196–209 and accompanying text. 
31.  See Feldman, Religious Minorities, supra note 19, at 251–59. 
32.  See Smith, 494 U.S at 879; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878). 
33.  Act of May 24, 2005, ch. 83, § 1, 2005 Minn. Laws 441, 442 (codified as amended at 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714 (West 2009 & Supp. 2015)).  
34.  The law had been enacted first in 2003.  Act of April 28, 2003, ch. 28, art. 2–3, 2003 
Minn. Laws 265, 272–98.  It was immediately challenged by religious, charitable, and 
municipal organizations who argued that the law violated the Minnesota constitution’s 
protection for religious liberty as well as the constitutional requirement that each law contain 
only one subject.  See Unity Church of St. Paul v. State, 694 N.W.2d 585, 590 & n.2, 600 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming the trial court, which struck down the law on that latter 
ground but did not consider the religious claims).  The legislature then reenacted the law and 
made it retroactive to the date of its initial adoption.  Act of May 24, 2005, ch. 83, § 1, 2005 
Minn. Laws 441, 442 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714 (West 2009 & 
Supp. 2015)).  
35.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(17)(a)–(b) (West 2009 & Supp. 2015). 
36.  Id. § 624.714(17)(c), (e). 
37.  Id. § 624.714(17)(a)–(c); Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 
200–02 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). 
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Two churches challenged the law claiming that it violated the 
Minnesota constitution’s “Freedom of Conscience” provision,38 the 
Federal First Amendment Right of Free Association,39 and the federal 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).40  
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on all counts.41  The court 
found that the signage requirement burdened the religious beliefs and 
practices of the churches by requiring them to parrot a state-mandated 
message.42  The trial court also found that the “parking lot” provision 
substantially burdened religion.43  The state argued that church parking 
lots should not be given any special religious protection unless they were 
used as part of a religious celebration.44  The court found, however, that 
parking lots “are integral to [the church’s] religious mission.”45  It would 
make little sense to allow churches to ban guns in the sanctuary but to 
 
38.  MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“Freedom of conscience; no preference to be given to any 
religious establishment or mode of worship.  The enumeration of rights in this constitution 
shall not deny or impair others retained by and inherent in the people.  The right of every 
man to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed; 
nor shall any man be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to 
maintain any religious or ecclesiastical ministry, against his consent; nor shall any control of 
or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law 
to any religious establishment or mode of worship; but the liberty of conscience hereby 
secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices 
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state, nor shall any money be drawn from the 
treasury for the benefit of any religious societies or religious or theological seminaries.”). 
39.  See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647–48 (2000) (holding that the 
First Amendment includes the right to not associate with others if doing so changes the 
message of the organization); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 
(1958) (stating that the First Amendment to United States Constitution protects right of 
individuals to associate with one another). 
40.  Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 
114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012)). 
41.  Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, No. 27-CV-05-11659, slip op. at 5–21 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. Nov. 14, 2006), 2006 WL 6111893, aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 745 N.W.2d 194 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2008).  
42.  Id. at 9–10; see also Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 204–05.  The churches’ pastors’ affidavits 
were sufficient for the court to find a substantial burden on religion.  See Edina, 
No. 27-CV-05-11659, slip op. at 9–10; see also Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 199–200.  The state 
attempted to rebut the harm by arguing that the churches could add additional messages to 
the signs so long as they still communicated that guns were forbidden.  See Edina, No. 27-CV-
05-11659, slip op. at 10; see also Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 205.  
43.  Edina, No. 27-CV-05-11659, slip op. at 10–12; see also Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 206–07. 
44.  See Edina, No. 27-CV-05-11659, slip op. at 11; see also Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 207. 
45.  Edina, No. 27-CV-05-11659, slip op. at 11. 
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be forced to tolerate them in their parking lots.46  The court also found 
that the landlordtenant provision burdened the churches’ religious 
beliefs because the church’s private tenants were there only because 
they furthered the churches’ religious missions.47 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the judgment that the law 
was a violation of the Minnesota constitution’s protection of religious 
freedom.48  Unlike the lower standard used under the United States 
Constitution,49 the state used a compelling interest test to determine the 
law’s constitutionality under the state constitution.50  The court found 
that the law substantially burdened the religious beliefs and practices of 
the churches.51  First, the law burdened religion by forcing the churches 
“to act in a manner that is inconsistent with their religious beliefs by 
requiring that they place specific, conspicuous signs at every entrance to 
the church.”52  The law required private establishments not only to post 
a sign but also to request that anyone who fails to comply leave the 
premises.53  Only at that point could the entrant be prosecuted for 
trespassing.  Both churches were traditional “peace” churches that 
sought to welcome everyone to their sanctuary and to use church 
property to further their religious missions.54  Moreover, church 
entrances have a special meaning to Lutherans.55  Requiring the church 
 
46.  The appellate court also noted that there was ample parking available on public 
property.  Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 209. 
47.  Edina, No. 27-CV-05-11659, slip op. at 12; see also Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 208.  The 
churches provided rented space for a child care center, services for the homeless, and other 
community organizations.  Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 208. 
48.  Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 213. 
49.  See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
50.  See Minnesota v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (1990) (stating that the 
Minnesota Constitution protects against incidental burdens on religion); Hill-Murray Fed’n of 
Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857, 864–65 (Minn. 1992) (adopting a four-
factor compelling interest/narrowly tailored test that is more protective of religious freedom 
than the federal Constitution). 
51.  Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 213. 
52.  Id. at 204–05. 
53.  Id. at 204 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(17)(b)(1)(i)–(ii) (2006)). 
54.  Id. at 203 (“Both churches are committed to peacemaking and nonviolence, to 
maintaining and providing a place of sanctuary, and to using church property in furtherance 
of their religious missions.”).  The state did not challenge the sincerity of the plaintiffs’ 
beliefs.  Id. at 205 n.5.  
55.  Id. at 203–04.  Martin Luther posted his Ninety-Five Theses on a church door, 
sparking the Protestant Reformation.  See id. at 200.  Entrances to Lutheran churches are 
associated with not only this historical incident but also the religious liberty associated with 
Luther and the Protestant reformers.  See id. 
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to communicate their prohibition of guns and their request to remove 
the guns constituted a burden on their religion by forcing them to alter 
these fundamental beliefs.56  The parking lot and tenant provisions 
caused similar burdens.57 
The court could find no compelling interest in subjecting the 
churches to the notice, the parking lot, or to the tenant requirement.58  
Minnesota law required that the state show that individualized religious 
exemptions would harm public safety.59  Although the stated purpose of 
the law was to protect individual Second Amendment rights to keep and 
bear arms for self-defense,60 the state did not provide any proof that 
churchgoers were being victimized in their parking lots.61  The court also 
rejected the state’s other asserted interests.62  
Because the court struck down the law under the state constitution, 
it did not reach the question of the law’s constitutionality under the 
federal Free Exercise Clause.63  At one time, federal free exercise claims 
were adjudicated using a compelling interest/narrowly tailored 
 
56.  Id. at 203–05. 
57.  Id. at 206–08.  Church parking lots are used for funeral processions and other 
mission-related activities.  Id. at 206–07.  The state proposed a “functional” test that would 
allow the churches to ban guns when they used their parking lots for religious activities.  Id. at 
207.  The court rejected this option because it would intrude the state even further into 
religions because the state would have to monitor the churches’ activities on their parking lots 
to determine their religious nature.  Id.  The tenant provision denied the churches “the 
opportunity to limit the use of the actual church premises to tenants whose operations are 
consistent with the churches’ commitment to nonviolence and their opposition to the carrying 
of guns.  These are the same facilities where religious services are conducted.”  Id. at 208. 
58.  Id. at 209–10. 
59.  Id. at 208. 
60.  See id. 
61.  Id. at 209 (“[T]he state presented no evidence in the district court that denying an 
exemption to religious institutions would result in the victimization of citizens at church 
functions, in church parking lots, or in church building areas used by tenants.  The state 
therefore did not show that religious practices, including the religious-based exclusion of 
weapons from church property and activities, are actually ‘inconsistent with public safety.’” 
(quoting Minnesota v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 398 (1990)). 
62.  The state claimed that the parking lot provision of the law advanced the right to 
travel while the message provision ensured that citizens received clear and adequate 
information about their gun rights.  Id.  As for the former, the court noted that adequate on-
street parking was available.  Id.  As for the latter, the court noted that colleges and 
universities had considerable flexibility to communicate their policies relating to the 
possession of weapons on school property.  Id. 
63.  Id. at 210.  It did, however, hold that the law was not a land-use regulation and 
therefore was not subject to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.  Id. 
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standard.64  In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court 
rejected the compelling interest standard.65  In its place, it substituted 
what seemed like a straightforward standard.  Neutral and generally 
applicable laws that only incidentally burdened religion will be analyzed 
under a rational basis test.66  A statute receives heightened scrutiny only 
if it targets religion or religious practice.67  Congress responded to the 
Smith case by adopting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA), which purported to restore the compelling interest/narrowly 
tailored test.68  The United States Supreme Court struck down RFRA 
because it exceeded Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
power.69  Congress then enacted the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act, which restored the compelling interest 
 
64.  See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718–19 (1981) (noting that the state may 
burden religion only if it pursues a compelling government interest with the least restrictive 
alternative); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (“[O]nly those interests of the 
highest order . . . can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”); 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (“It is basic that no showing merely of a rational 
relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive 
constitutional area, ‘[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion 
for permissible limitation.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 
530 (1945))).  
65.  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that neutral and generally 
applicable laws do not violate Free Exercise Clause). 
66.  See id.  Smith was exceptionally controversial.  See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The 
Supreme Court’s Assault on Free Exercise, and the Amicus Brief That Was Never Filed, 8 J.L. 
& RELIGION 99 (1990); Steven D. Smith, Free Exercise Doctrine and the Discourse of 
Disrespect, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 519 (1994).  But see William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith 
and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991). 
67.  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 
(1993) (“At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue 
discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it 
is undertaken for religious reasons.”); see also Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise and 
Individualized Exemptions: Herein of Smith, Sherbert, Hogwarts, and Religious Liberty, 83 
NEB. L. REV. 1178, 1203 (2005) (“[S]trict scrutiny will apply if the religious-liberty claimant 
establishes two things: (1) that the State has in place an individualized process or system for 
allocating governmental benefits or burdens and (2) that his or her religious-liberty claim has 
been rejected under the ad hoc scheme.”). 
68.  Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012)). 
69.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act exceeded Congress’s power to enforce violations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment).  Flores, like Smith, seemed to break with prior cases in this area.  See, e.g., John 
M.A. DiPippa, The Death and Resurrection of RFRA: Integrating Lopez and Boerne, 20 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 767, 771 (1998); Douglas Laycock, The Religious Exemption Debate, 
11 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 139, 141–44 (2009) [hereinafter Laycock, Religious 
Exemption]. 
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test only for land-use regulations and burdens on institutionalized 
persons.70  
In GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, several individuals, a gun rights 
organization, and a Baptist church challenged a Georgia law that 
prohibited the possession of weapons in a “place of worship.”71  The 
individual plaintiffs claimed that the law violated their First 
Amendment right to the free exercise of religion.72  They argued that 
the law violated their rights by “prohibiting them from engaging in 
activities in a place of worship when those activities are generally 
permitted throughout the state.”73  Although the Eleventh Circuit found 
that the plaintiffs had standing,74 it concluded that they failed to state a 
free exercise challenge because they omitted any factual matter that 
pointed to a burden on a sincerely held religious belief.75  The court 
noted that the First Amendment does not protect personal preferences 
or secular beliefs76 and the plaintiffs failed to distinguish their personal 
preference to be armed from any religious duty to carry weapons:  
 
70.  Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 
114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012)).  The original RFRA still applies to the 
actions of the federal government.  See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006) (“Under RFRA, the Federal Government may not, as a 
statutory matter, substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, ‘even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2000))).  
RFRA has taken on a higher profile with recent litigation over insurance requirements 
imposed by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.  See Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–
13(a)(4) (2012)) (establishing minimum coverage requirements for insurance plans including 
certain contraceptive services); Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the 
Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,873–82 (July 2, 2013) (codified as amended at 
45 C.F.R. § 147.131(2013)) (establishing a religious organizations exemption from paying for 
contraceptive services, provided they certify their status); see also Ave Maria Found. v. 
Sebelius, 991 F. Supp. 2d 957 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (suggesting that the certification requirement 
imposed by federal health care law violates Religious Freedom Restoration Act); E. Tex. 
Baptist Univ. v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 743 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (discussing the Act’s 
requirements and the development of the regulations concerning religious organizations). 
71.  GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1249 n.8 (11th Cir. 2012).  The 
Georgia statute made it a misdemeanor to carry a “weapon or a long gun” in a place of 
worship.  GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127(b) (2011 & Supp. 2013).  
72.  GeorgiaCarry.org, 687 F.3d at 1255. 
73.  Id. 
74.  Id. at 1252.  The plaintiffs’ fear of prosecution satisfied the injury-in-fact 
requirement of standing.  See id.  The plaintiffs’ “serious intent” to violate the statute and the 
state’s intention to enforce it creates the injury necessary for standing.  Id. 
75.  Id. at 1255. 
76.  Id. at 1256 (“The Supreme Court has reiterated time and time again that personal 
preferences and secular beliefs do not warrant the protection of the Free Exercise Clause.”). 
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We searched the Amended Complaint to no avail in an attempt 
to find factual allegations that could possibly be construed as 
alleging that the Carry Law imposes a constitutionally 
impermissible burden on one of Plaintiffs’ sincerely held 
religious beliefs.  At various points, Plaintiffs allege that they 
would like to carry a handgun in a place of worship for the 
protection either of themselves, their family, their flock, or other 
members of the Tabernacle.  Plaintiffs conclude by alleging that 
the Carry Law interferes with their free exercise of religion by 
prohibiting them from engaging in activities in a place of worship 
when those activities are generally permitted throughout the 
State.  That Plaintiffs “would like” to carry a firearm in order to 
be able to act in “self-defense” is a personal preference, 
motivated by a secular purpose.  As we note supra, there is no 
First Amendment protection for personal preferences; nor is 
there protection for secular beliefs.77 
The plaintiffs argued that they did not have to show a burden when a 
law was not neutral.78  They asserted that the law could not be neutral as 
to religion if it specifically set houses of worship apart from other 
secular property, but according to the court, this mischaracterized 
existing Free Exercise Clause precedent.79  A free exercise complaint 
will be dismissed if it “does not allege that (1) the plaintiff holds a belief, 
not a preference, that is sincerely held and religious in nature, not 
merely secular; and (2) the law at issue in some way impacts the 
plaintiff’s ability to either hold that belief or act pursuant to that 
belief.”80 
Litigants like the ones in GeorgiaCarry.org will have trouble 
articulating their claim in religious terms.  What exactly is the nature of 
the claim?  Is it to be armed in general or is it to be armed in church?  Is 
there a symbolic meaning to carrying weapons in general or specifically 
into a place of worship?  It may have a basis in a deeply felt cultural or 
social imperative, but unless they can point to some theological basis or 
religious practice to explain how a ban on gun possession interferes with 
their religious practice, neither the Free Exercise Clause nor federal law 
will come into play.81  This is where the Georgia plaintiffs foundered.  
 
77.  Id. at 1258. 
78.  Id. at 1255. 
79.  Id. at 1255–56. 
80.  Id. at 1256–57. 
81.  See id. 
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They are undoubtedly correct that the law set religion apart, but they 
fail the threshold question of whether or not a law burdens a religious 
practice.  In any event, the Eleventh Circuit seemed skeptical of their 
claim.82 
On the other hand, the Minnesota court had no difficulty finding a 
religious burden.83  Indeed, the state did not challenge the religious 
claim and the existence of a burden seemed almost self-evident to the 
court.84  Yet deciding what is a religious burden is difficult task that is 
not supposed to turn on the court’s “perception of the particular belief 
or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, 
consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First 
Amendment protection.”85  “Courts should not . . . dissect religious 
beliefs because the believer admits that he is ‘struggling’ with his 
position or because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and 
precision that a more sophisticated person might employ.”86 
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF SIKHS AND KIRPANS 
While the Baptist plaintiffs in GeorgiaCarry.org had trouble 
connecting weapon possession to religious beliefs, Sikhs can make that 
claim easily.  Their problem, however, is that it must be sanitized and 
tamed to receive protection.  Sikh men are required to have in their 
possession five items, one of which is a curved dagger or sword.87  Here 
the religious adherent can persuasively argue that the possession of the 
weapon is itself a religious practice.88  A Sikh man can easily show that a 
weapon ban substantially burdens his religious practice.  The fit between 
the state’s means and ends becomes the most critical part of the analysis.  
 
82.  See id. at 1255 (“Plaintiffs allege that the Carry Law ‘interferes with the free 
exercise of religion by Plaintiffs by prohibiting them from engaging in activities in a place of 
worship when those activities are generally permitted throughout the state.’  This so-called 
prohibition applies to anyone who enters a place of worship—regardless of the person’s 
religious preference.” (citation omitted)).  This seems to conflate the question of religious 
burden with the question of the law’s neutrality.  The question is not whether the law applies 
to a person with a different belief about carrying weapons.  See id. at 1256–57.  The question 
is whether or not the law burdens this particular plaintiff’s religious beliefs.  See id.  
83.  Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). 
84.  Id. at 203–08. 
85.  Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).  
86.  Id. at 715. 
87.  See Baker, supra note 21, at 15–16; Dipanwita Deb, Note, Of Kirpans, Schools, and 
the Free Exercise Clause: Cheema v. Thompson Cuts Through RFRA’s Inadequacies, 23 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 877, 881–82 (1996).  
88.  Deb, supra note 87, at 881–82. 
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There is considerable litigation, for example, concerning the 
requirement for facial hair, especially in the employment and prison 
contexts.89  
In Cheema v. Thompson, the Ninth Circuit found a school district’s 
weapons ban burdened Sikh children’s religious beliefs.90  The children’s 
parents challenged the school district’s total ban on all weapons.91  
Because the district believed that state law prohibited the possession of 
knives on school property, it banned kirpan possession.92  According to 
the court, “[t]his left the Cheema children with two choices if they 
wished to attend school: either leave their kirpans at home (and violate 
a fundamental tenet of their religion) or bring them to school (and face 
expulsion and/or criminal prosecution).”93  The children remained away 
from school while their parents challenged the ban under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act.94 
There was no question that the ban burdened a sincerely held 
religious belief.95  Unlike the Baptist plaintiffs in Georgia, the Sikh 
children could point to a centuries-old, well-articulated tradition 
requiring the possession of the kirpan.96  Although the school district 
 
89.  See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015); Dawinder S. Sidhu, Religious 
Freedom and Inmate Grooming Standards, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 923 (2012). 
90.  Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 885–86 (9th Cir. 1995); see Deb, supra note 87, 
at 885–86.  The Canadian Supreme Court reached the same conclusion as the Cheema court.  
See Multani v. Comm’n scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, 2006 SCC (Can.) 
(stating that a complete ban on weapon possession in schools violated a Sikh child’s freedom 
of religion); see also BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 1–4 (2013) (arguing 
against accommodating the kirpan in schools); Mark S. Kende, Free Exercise of Religion: A 
Pragmatic and Comparative Perspective, 55 S.D. L. REV. 412, 419–21 (2010) (discussing 
Multani in comparing Canadian courts’ approach in religion cases to that of South Africa and 
the United States); Allison N. Crawford, Note, Learning Lessons from Multani: Considering 
Canada’s Response to Religious Garb Issues in Public Schools, 36 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
159 (2007).  This Article excludes those decisions that have upheld kirpan bans in airports and 
other places where security concerns will trump all other issues.  Rather, this Article focuses 
on those locations where security, while important, is not paramount and subject to some 
accommodation. 
91.  Cheema, 67 F.3d at 885. 
92.  Id. at 884. 
93.  Id. 
94.  Id. at 884–85. 
95.  Id. at 885.  Even the dissent agreed completely on this point.  See id. at 889 (Wiggins, 
J., dissenting) (“It is clear that the District’s no-knives policy . . . substantially burdens [the 
children’s] free exercise of their religion.”). 
96.  Amarjeet S. Bhachu, Note, A Shield for Swords, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 197, 200–03 
(1996). 
 1118 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:1103 
had a compelling interest in campus safety, the court held that there 
were less restrictive alternatives to a total ban: 
But we simply could not conclude that nothing short of a 
wholesale ban would adequately protect student safety.  The 
problem was a total failure of proof; the school district refused to 
produce any evidence whatever to demonstrate the lack of a less 
restrictive alternative.97 
The court noted that other school districts had successfully 
accommodated Sikh children without sacrificing student safety.98  The 
court upheld the lower court’s injunction that allowed kirpan possession 
in schools under the following conditions: that the kirpan have a dull 
blade, is about three and one-half inches in length, and is sewn into its 
sheath and worn under clothing.99  These policies apparently were aimed 
at making the kirpan unavailable for use by either literally blunting it or 
making it inaccessible.  The dissent argued that this accommodation did 
not serve the district’s interest in safety.100  The knives are 
unquestionably dangerous.  Even when sewn to their sheaths, they can 
still be removed.101 
 
97.  Cheema, 67 F.3d at 885.  Cheema was decided prior to City of Boerne v. Flores, 
where the Supreme Court struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, at least as it 
applied to actions by state and local governments.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 
(1997).  RFRA required that state and local government actions that substantially burden a 
sincerely held religious belief must be the least restrictive way to advance a compelling state 
interest.  Cheema, 67 F.3d at 888 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).  Today, because the weapons ban is 
facially neutral as to religion and generally applicable to all students, the school district would 
probably only have to show that the weapons ban was reasonably related to a legitimate state 
interest in order to survive a free exercise challenge.  See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990).  Nevertheless, the case illustrates the recurring problems with religious freedom 
claims and the shifting nature of neutrality.  Of course, developments in Second Amendment 
law provide new legal obstacles to weapons bans.  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. 
Ct. 3020 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
98.  Cheema, 67 F.3d at 885 n.3. 
99.  Id. at 886. 
100.  Id. at 890–91 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (“The district court was presented with an 
affidavit from a school secretary who was able to observe Jaspreet Cheema’s (supposedly 
unnoticeable) kirpan.  Worse still, she observed that Jaspreet’s 4 year-old brother was 
wearing one, too.  And, most alarmingly, the secretary stated that Jaspreet told her that ‘if 
anybody steals from me, I can put this to them.’  While making this statement, he grabbed his 
kirpan.”). 
101.  Id. at 891. 
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Moreover, there was no evidence that the children in question were 
any more mature than other children their age and, therefore, should 
not have knives available to them during the school day.102 
What was more intriguing about the dissent, however, was its direct 
analysis of the nature of the actual religious belief at issue.  Kirpans 
symbolize a Sikh’s desire to do “God’s Justice.”103  Expert testimony at 
trial indicated that the weapon was not simply symbolic.104  Indeed, a 
useless weapon would not serve its religious purpose.  Sikhs must carry a 
kirpan so that is can be used to defend their religion.105  According to 
plaintiff’s expert, only real, functional knives could satisfy the religious 
duty to carry the weapon.106  Neither carrying a symbolic kirpan nor 
riveting it into its sheath would satisfy the religious duty to be armed.107  
Those changes “would alter it and destroy its character as a kirpan.  A 
kirpan is a knife, not a knife and sheath combination.”108 
The dissent looked at the knife objectively and not through the 
subjective, religious lens of the Sikh believer.109  If the kirpan is a knife, 
then the school district has the right to ban its possession regardless of 
its religious significance to Sikh believers.110  Viewed from this 
perspective, the proposed accommodations were incoherent and 
ineffective.  The injunction allowed the children to carry the weapon if it 
was sewn into the sheath and worn under the clothing.111  But as the 
plaintiff’s expert pointed out, this did not render the knife 
 
102.  The dissent pointed out at least two instances where the children had taken their 
knives out of their sheaths.  Id.  In one instance, they were trying to cut the rope on the flag 
pole.  Id.  In a similar vein, a teacher claimed that she saw the Sikh children attempting to 
hoist a kirpan up the flag pole.  Id. 
103.  Id. at 887. 
104.  Id. at 890. 
105.  Bhachu, supra note 96, at 203 (“The kirpan, then, is not only part of the identity of 
a Khalsa Sikh, but an instrument of self-defense.”). 
106.  Cheema, 67 F.3d at 890 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). 
107.  See id.  
108.  Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). 
109.  Id. (“[W]hile a knife can indeed be a kirpan, and thus have deep spiritual meaning 
to a Sikh, this does not change the fact that the underlying object is, still, a knife.  In other 
words, I would allow the school district, and the district court, to look at what an object is 
objectively, rather than through the subjective eyes of a claimant.”); see also MARCI A. 
HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 116 (2005) (stating 
that the dissent considered third party interests along with believer’s interests). 
110.  See Cheema, 67 F.3d at 890 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). 
111.  Id. at 886 (majority opinion).  
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inaccessible.112  The lower court and the plaintiffs seemed to suggest that 
the kirpan was somehow not a knife, but as the dissent pointed out, this 
conclusion was belied by the plaintiff’s own experts.113  Common sense 
and religious belief both point to one conclusion: A knife is a knife.  
When combined with another required item—the kara—the conclusion 
is inescapable: the kirpan is a weapon whose religious significance lies in 
its availability to be used in defense of the faith.114  
The district court relied on the accommodations that other school 
districts had in place to find that a total ban violated RFRA.115  But, as 
the dissent pointed out, those districts took more assertive measures to 
ensure that the kirpan was rendered unusable.116  If the dissent was 
correct, these other policies did not support the more expansive policy 
approved by the district court. 
Moreover, they also point out the intractability of religious 
accommodations in this circumstance.  The other school districts 
essentially changed the nature of the kirpan from an actual weapon 
 
112.  See id. at 890–91 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). 
113.  Id. 
114.  See id. at 890.  The dissent argued that the actual religious belief and practice 
required that the kirpan be a real weapon capable of use in defense of the faith.  Id.  The 
dissent pointed to the affidavit of the plaintiff’s expert who, “although unintentionally, 
revealed that even through the eyes of a Sikh, a kirpan is indeed a weapon.”  Id.  While the 
expert stated that a kirpan “‘would never be regarded [as a weapon] by a Khalsa Sikh,’ he 
referred to the kirpan as ‘sword’ and a ‘knife.’”  Id. (alteration in original).  “He explained 
that ‘[a] kirpan must be made of steel and have a curved blade.  It is not particularly sharp, 
although it is an actual knife or dagger.’”  Id. (alteration in original).  The expert “explained 
that another requirement of Khalsa Sikhs is that they wear a steel bracelet, called a kara, at 
all times, ‘to remind that the sword [kirpan] is to be used only in self defense and the 
propagation of justice.’”  Id. (alteration in original); see also Jeremy Waldron, One Law For 
All? The Logic of Cultural Accommodation, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 7 (2002) (“In fact, 
the Sikh’s religious obligation is an obligation to present himself in public as a combination of 
saint and warrior.”). 
115.  See Cheema, 67 F.3d at 892 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). 
116.  Id. at 892.  The dissent noted that  
[t]wo of the three “examples of accommodation” to which the majority referred 
involved school districts that only allowed kirpans if the two restrictions the District 
forwarded in the present case were followed.  Both Yuba City and Live Oak Unified 
School Districts only allow kirpans that are no longer than 3 inches in total length, 
and even those must be riveted to their sheaths.  The third school district to which 
the majority referred has different restrictions (a rounded tip and a blunted edge), 
that accomplish the same thing: the kirpan is rendered a non-functional knife. 
Id. 
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available for defensive use to a mere symbol.117  It made it so that the 
kirpan could no longer serve its actual religious purpose.  In Cheema, 
the Sikh plaintiffs even argued that the kirpan was not really a knife or a 
weapon.118 
 The Sikh claim and the dissent’s skepticism illustrate the inherent 
tension in religious freedom law.  Most religious claims are subjective.  
That is, they rely on faith in an unseen reality or symbolic actions that 
express a religious truth.119  Their religious significance disappears when 
that lens is removed and they are viewed “objectively.”120  The other 
school district’s accommodations were typical of the way that minority 
religions must dilute their beliefs to gain accommodation or 
 
117.   See Waldron, supra note 114, at 7 (“[T]here is something patronizing in the view 
that the kirpan is carried by the Sikh initiate purely as a matter of religious observance, as 
though its ceremonial significance had nothing to do with its significance as a weapon.”). 
118.  Cheema, 67 F.3d at 890.  
119.  Take, for example, the Roman Catholic practice of lighting candles during special 
services.  See The Roman Missal and the Easter Vigil, U.S. CONF. CATHOLIC BISHOPS,  http://
www.usccb.org/prayer-and-worship/liturgical-year/triduum/roman-missal-and-the-easter-vigil.
cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3NS2-CZ6Q.  The Easter Vigil 
service, for example, begins in darkness.  Id.  The priest solemnly enters the church carrying 
the Paschal candle, a large candle symbolizing that Jesus is the light of the world.  See id.  The 
congregation holds individual candles, which are lit from the single flame of the Paschal 
candle.  See id.  The people pass this light from candle to candle until all the candles are lit.  
See id.  These remain the only source of light until later in the service, when they are 
extinguished and the church lights are dramatically turned on.  See id.  To the believer, this 
expresses deep and important meaning.  See id.  The candles are more than burning wicks, but 
to an objective fire inspector, they are a potential fire hazard.  See, e.g., Sonja Barisic, Symbol 
of Salvation, or Fire Hazard? Fire Marshal Bans Candles Held by Worshipers, LUDINGTON 
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 8, 1993, at 2, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=110&da
t=19930408&id=7LcLAAAAIBAJ&sjid=3lUDAAAAIBAJ&pg=7268,544463, archived at ht
tp://perma.cc/JZN2-D97V; Easter Vigil Dispute: Archbishop Appeals Hand-Held Candle Ban, 
BEAVER CNTY. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1993, at A1, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?n
id=2002&dat=19930408&id=27QiAAAAIBAJ&sjid=ErUFAAAAIBAJ&pg=4923,1623939, 
archived at http://perma.cc/3BBD-RSV5.  It is probable that cities have granted exemptions 
for such services, but this only illustrates a further problem: majority religions find it easy to 
acquire accommodations for this practice even if “objectively” dangerous, while minority 
religions may not be so successful. 
120.  For example, Roman Catholics believe that the consecrated host is the real body of 
Jesus Christ.  See The Real Presence of Jesus Christ in the Sacrament of the Eucharist: Basic 
Questions and Answers, U.S. CONF. CATHOLIC BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/prayer-and-w
orship/the-mass/order-of-mass/liturgy-of-the-eucharist/the-real-presence-of-jesus-christ-in-the
-sacrament-of-the-eucharist-basic-questions-and-answers.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/WKY2-FPG8.  Objectively, the host is a wafer of unleavened 
bread, but the believer does not treat it as such.  Rather, the belief in the Real Presence 
compels believers to act reverently toward the host and to take steps to prevent its misuse or 
destruction.  Id.  But seen from the dissent’s perspective, the host remains a dry wafer and 
that is how the law should see it.   
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acceptance.121  Indeed, the policy in the reported decision illustrates this, 
too.  The school district’s accommodations suggested that they believed 
they had “neutralized” the knives’ danger without also recognizing that 
truly doing so emptied the practice of religious significance.  
Brian Leiter uses the kirpan example as a central feature of his 
position that religious practices should not be given special 
constitutional exemptions from general laws.122  Leiter posits two 
hypothetical boys: one boy, a Sikh who carries a knife to fulfill a 
religious obligation, and the other boy, a young man in a rural 
community who is given a knife as a cultural rite of passage to 
manhood.123  Leiter is puzzled by the different treatment these boys 
would receive if they sought to bring their knives to school: 
There is no Western democracy, at present, in which the [rural] 
boy . . . has prevailed or would prevail in a challenge to a general 
prohibition on the carrying of weapons in the school.  Were he a 
Sikh he would stand a good chance of winning.  But if he can 
only appeal to a century-old tradition, central to his identity, to 
which he feels categorically bound by his family traditions and 
upbringing, he is out of luck.124 
Leiter notes that the Multani decision upheld the right of the Sikh 
children to wear real knives if they held a sincere personal and religious 
belief in its importance.125  The court noted the unique characteristics of 
schools that distinguished them from places like courthouses and 
airports, where the kirpan could be banned.126  Yet, as Leiter points out, 
the court failed to consider those circumstances in which schools may be 
uniquely vulnerable to violence from weapons carried on students’ 
 
121.  See Cheema, 67 F.3d at 892 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).  Religious belief and practice 
must often be sanitized, tamed, or modified.  See Stephen M. Feldman, A Christian America 
and the Separation of Church and State, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 
261, 262–66 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000) [hereinafter Feldman, Christian America]. 
122.  LEITER, supra note 90, at 64–67. 
123.  Id. at 1–3. 
124.  Id. at 3. 
125.  Id. at 64–65; see also Multani v. Comm’n scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys [2006] 1 
S.C.R. 256 (Can. S.C.C.).  
126.  See Multani v. Comm’n scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 (Can. 
S.C.C.) (declaring that schools are partnerships that can control their environment better than 
other public spaces); LEITER, supra note 90, at 64–66. 
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persons.127  He cannot see why the justifications for banning the kirpan 
in other places do not apply equally to schools.128  And, if the Sikh child 
can carry a real knife in school, then he cannot see any difference with 
the sincere claim of the rural child to carry his knife.129  Ultimately, he 
concludes that the two boys should be treated the same and that they 
should both lose.130  Religious exemptions from general laws should not 
be granted “unless those exemptions do not shift burdens or risks onto 
others.”131 
Leiter’s principle suggests a different approach in the 
GeorgiaCarry.org and Edina cases.  Not only can the plaintiffs rely on a 
sustained and sincere tradition (especially in the south), they have also 
built their claim on a religious foundation.132  The right (if not the duty) 
of self-defense is well established in Christian theology.133  Granting 
them an exemption from the gun law would not shift the burden to 
anyone else.  Unlike children who are compelled to be in school, no 
adult is forced to attend any particular church.134  Churchgoers who 
object to fellow members being armed are free to find a church with 
beliefs and practices more compatible with their own.  
Even if the right is not religious in nature, it points out how 
problematic it is for courts to distinguish religious beliefs from 
convictions of conscience.  In GeorgiaCarry.org, the church’s desire to 
be armed for self-defense grew out of not only a long tradition but also a 
shooting in a nearby church.135  Their desire could be a religious belief or 
a conviction of conscience, deeply and sincerely held, as well as a secular 
preference for safety.  Leiter is skeptical that religious claims should be 
 
127.  LEITER, supra note 90, at 65–66 (noting the general lack of armed guards, the 
immaturity of the students, and the natural and inevitable “antagonistic relationships” among 
students and between faculty and students). 
128.  Id. at 66. 
129.  See id. at 66–67 (“[T]here is no principled reason for legal or constitutional regimes 
to single out religion for protection.”). 
130.  Id. at 4. 
131.  Id.; see also HAMILTON, supra note 109, at 116 (criticizing the Cheema majority for 
“thinking only in terms of the needs of the believer”). 
132.  I will assume its sincerity for the moment. 
133.  See infra Part V.  
134.  Of course, children are present during a worship service, but they are typically in a 
room surrounded by adults, the exact opposite of the makeup of elementary and secondary 
schools. 
135.  See Whitman, supra note 12, at 1988–89. 
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given special exemptions when secular claims of conscience will not.136  
In the end, Leiter’s counsel is to limit the reach of religious exemptions 
because a principled application of a broad exemption for conscience 
would include so many claims that it “would appear to amount to a 
legalization of anarchy.”137 
On the other hand, the Edina churches’ claims for exemptions from 
the signage and request requirements set religion apart from every other 
private establishment.138  The law imposed little additional burden on 
the religious establishment that other private establishments did not 
share.  Rather, their religious claim allowed them to be set apart from a 
law that everyone else had to follow.  Per Leiter, there is no principled 
way to justify this exception, especially when the burden on religious 
practice is almost non-existent.139 
When it comes to possession of a kirpan, however, the more precise 
the believer articulates his belief, the less likely he is to gain protection.  
The Sikh plaintiffs in Cheema and their fellow Sikhs in the other schools 
mentioned in the opinion had to water down the significance of the 
kirpan in order to carry it in schools.140  If they had claimed that the 
religious significance of the kirpan was that it be available for use in self-
defense, they would have lost their case.  Religious gun owners face a 
similar challenge.  Unlike the Sikh’s, the GeorgiaCarry.org plaintiffs 
could not articulate a clear theological or historical justification for gun 
possession in church.141  Rather, as the Eleventh Circuit pointed out, 
they were left asserting what sounded like a personal preference.142  
There is a religious argument for gun possession, but articulating it will 
drag courts into evaluating the reasonableness of the religious belief, a 
place where courts do not want to go.143  
 
136.  See LEITER, supra note 90, at 94–97. 
137.  Id. at 94.  
138.  Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). 
139.  LEITER, supra note 90, at 54–67. 
140.  See Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F. 3d 883, 895 (9th Cir. 1995) (Wiggens, J., 
dissenting); see also id. at 884 (majority opinion) (describing the kirpan as a “ceremonial 
knife”). 
141.  GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1255–58 (11th Cir. 2012). 
142.  Id. at 1258. 
143.  See, e.g., Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886–87 (1990) (stating that courts 
should not determine plausibility or place of religious claim); Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 
680, 699 (1989) (arguing that the judiciary is not competent to determine centrality of 
religious belief or practice); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714–16 (1981) (stating that 
the judiciary should not ask whether a claimant’s religious understanding is correct). 
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V. IS THERE A RELIGIOUS DUTY OF SELF DEFENSE? 
David Kopel argues for a religious duty of self-defense, a duty that 
presumably prevents states from prohibiting gun possession.144  He 
accurately, if tendentiously,145 relates the history of the traditional 
Christian reliance on the just war theory.146  He argues that Western 
Christianity’s recent emphasis on “pacifism” is a departure from 
traditional doctrine.147  He concludes that, at least in the Roman 
Catholic tradition, “states and families” have a religious duty of self-
defense.148  He relies on Vatican documents that discuss this duty in the 
context of governments intervening in other states to prevent abuses of 
human rights.149  Indeed, these very documents approve gun control 
measures for individuals.150  Kopel agrees with the documents until this 
point where he interposes secular constitutional rights to bear arms to 
refute the Vatican’s conclusion.151  Kopel conflates the duty of civil 
authorities to defend their people with the duty of individuals to be 
armed.152  One can agree that an individual may act in self-defense 
without also concluding that that individual must be armed at all times. 
At the same time, Kopel correctly points out that mainstream 
religions have always approved of the use of force in some 
circumstances, not the least of which was for individual self-defense.153  
To that extent, churches like those in the Edina case have weaker 
religious claims than the plaintiffs in GeorgiaCarry.org.  This is a 
disagreement among Christians about the interpretation of Scripture 
and Tradition, the authority of institutional interpretation as opposed to 
individual interpretation, and the relative importance of one over the 
other.154  In other words, these are religious disputes.  To resolve them, 
one must engage the materials and come to a religious conclusion.  The 
 
144.  Kopel, Evolving Attitudes, supra note 20, at 1764–65 (“[A]rmed defense was a 
“right” and a “duty” for families and for nations.”). 
145.  Id. at 1763 (describing the 2003 military action in Iraq as a “liberation”). 
146.  Id. at 1714–19. 
147.  Id. at 1769 (“[T]oday pacifism has greater respectability within orthodox 
Christianity than any time in the past 1700 years.”).  
148.  See id. at 1764–65. 
149.  Id. at 1764–66. 
150.  Id. at 1765. 
151.  Id. at 1765–66. 
152.  See id. 
153.  Id. at 1714–19. 
154.  See Kopel, Evolving Attitudes, supra note 20. 
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problem, of course, is that this is exactly what courts should not do in 
free exercise cases. 
VI. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY ISSUES IN CATEGORICAL AND OPT-OUT 
JURISDICTIONS 
In categorical jurisdictions, places of worship feel singled out 
because the law specifically excludes religious property.155  State laws 
that categorically prohibit the possession of guns in churches are not 
neutral as to religion.  That is, unlike laws that treat churches the same 
as any other private property owner, categorical exclusions carved out a 
special exception for churches.  
Other pieces of property are also categorically excluded.  Often 
statutes will prohibit possession of guns not only in churches but also in 
schools, government buildings, and other places where large groups may 
gather.156  This suggests that there are non-religious reasons for 
prohibiting gun possession in churches.  The state may argue health and 
safety, ease of enforcement, or other similar arguments.157  Churches will 
claim, however, that they are singled out because they vary so widely in 
their size, location, and practice.158  That is, the other places 
categorically excluded all have similar features.  For example, schools 
will not vary largely in size.  They will all contain minors or vulnerable 
individuals, and they all house people for considerable periods of the 
day.  Churches, on the other hand, range in size from the mega church 
to the living room church.  Moreover, these churches will have vastly 
different missions and vastly different practices.  For some, it would be 
unthinkable to allow their members to be armed.159  But for others the 
question may be much closer.160  Thus, they argue that the categorical 
exclusion of churches is not neutral as to religion because it privileges 
one particular theology about weapons and peace.161  
In opt-out jurisdictions, however, gun laws are neutral as to religion.  
For example, the Minnesota concealed carry law does not single out 
 
155.  See, e.g., GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012). 
156.  E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127(b) (2011 & Supp. 2013). 
157.  See, e.g., Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 208–09 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2008). 
158.  See, e.g., id. at 212–13. 
159.  See, e.g., Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 203. 
160.  See, e.g., GeorgiaCarry.org, 687 F.3d at 1249 n.8. 
161.  See id. at 1255–59. 
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churches.162  Rather, it includes churches in the general description of 
private establishments and imposes on them the same duties and 
responsibilities as other private establishments.163  Thus, the law is 
neutral because it simply requires churches who object to the presence 
of guns on their property to follow the same steps as other private 
establishments.  Here the problem for the church is getting past the 
neutrality and general applicability threshold.  That is, the church can 
show a real burden to its religious belief and practice, but a court will 
never get to that question under the federal Constitution unless the 
church can show the law’s lack of neutrality.164  
Pro-gun churches will not be able to show any religious significance 
to their beliefs, while anti-gun churches will not be able to show that the 
laws are targeted at religion.  The pro-gun churches will have to allege a 
“theology of gun possession” that may be manufactured only for the 
litigation.  Courts would have to examine the theological basis of the 
pro-gun claim in order to determine whether or not the law burdens 
religion.165  Perhaps that is why courts easily glide over the burden issue 
to rule on other facets of the analysis,166 but ignoring the burden 
question in these gun cases is impossible.  The Minnesota courts were 
seemingly persuaded by theological and religious claims of the 
plaintiffs.167  That may also be true for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision.  
It created a distinction between “personal preferences” and “religious 
beliefs.”168  Apparently, the plaintiff churches in that case could not 
frame their arguments in terms religious enough to satisfy the court.169  
 
162.  See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(17)(a)–(c) (West 2009 & Supp. 2015). 
163.  See id.; see also Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 201–02. 
164.  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that neutral and generally 
applicable laws do not violate Free Exercise Clause). 
165.  See Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 207, 210–13. 
166.  See id. at 211 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)). 
167.  David Kopel might suggest that this was because of the Western church’s pacifism 
and reliance on sentiment instead of reason.  Kopel, Evolving Attitudes, supra note 20, at 
1749–50. 
168.  See GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1256–58 (11th Cir. 2012). 
169.  See id. at 1258–59. 
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VII.THREE PERSISTENT RELIGIOUS LIBERTY PROBLEMS 
A. The Non-Mainstream Religion Problem 
Although these cases are not likely to dominate free exercise 
dockets, they illustrate several ongoing free exercise issues.  First, they 
show how difficult it is for courts to conceptualize religion claims, 
especially for non-mainstream religions.170  Scholars have long 
documented the difficulties non-mainstream religions have winning free 
exercise claims.171  Courts may more readily find religious burdens when 
a mainstream religion’s claim does not challenge the conventional 
assumptions about “normal” religious belief and practices.172  These 
religions are so identified with majoritarian interests that it is difficult to 
see them as separate from them.173  
Although most free exercise claimants lose, of the successful 
claimants, majority religions win more often than non-majority 
religions.174  Successful free exercise claims by minority religions are 
even less frequent.175  Mainstream Christian religions may find that 
 
170.  See Feldman, Religious Minorities, supra note 19, at 251–59. 
171.  See, e.g., Feldman, Christian America, supra note 121; Samuel J. Levine, Toward a 
Religious Minority Voice: A Look at Free Exercise Law Through a Religious Minority 
Perspective, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 153, 160–62 (1996); Frank S. Ravitch, A Crack in the 
Wall: Pluralism, Prayer, and Pain in the Public Schools, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL 
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 121, at 296, 296–303.  But see Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions 
and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 919, 922 (2004) (“[P]rotection . . . of minority 
faiths should not be the sole criterion for Religion Clause cases.”); Rosalie Berger Levinson, 
First Monday—The Dark Side of Federalism in the Nineties: Restricting Rights of Religious 
Minorities, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 47 (1998); Suzanna Sherry, Religion and the Public Square: 
Making Democracy Safe for Religious Minorities, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 499 (1998); David E. 
Steinberg, Religious Exemptions as Affirmative Action, 40 EMORY L.J. 77 (1991). 
172.  See Feldman, Religious Minorities, supra note 19, at 251–59. 
173.  See infra text accompanying notes 196–205.  Nevertheless, unless a court uses a 
higher standard than currently used by the Supreme Court, the challengers may still lose 
because the laws are neutral and generally applicable.  Compare Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 
733 F.3d 72, 99 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 683 (2013) (holding that the insurance 
requirement did not violate Free Exercise Clause because Affordable Care Act neutral and 
generally applicable), with Catholic Diocese of Beaumont v. Sebelius, 10 F. Supp. 3d 725 
(E.D. Tex. 2014) (holding that the insurance requirement violated RFRA). 
174.  See James C. Brent, An Agent and Two Principals: U.S. Court of Appeals 
Responses to Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 27 AM. POL. Q. 236, 250–51 (1999) (stating that 38.9% of 
the winners were from mainstream Catholic and Protestant religions compared to 24.5% from 
non-mainstream religions). 
175.  Stephen Feldman argues that non-majority religions win a few free exercise claims 
but non-Christian minority religions rarely do.  Feldman, Religious Minorities, supra note 19, 
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legislatures are less likely to interfere with majoritarian practices, and if 
they do, judges are more receptive because they more readily identify 
with the claimants and their practices.176  Stephen Feldman describes 
how litigators for Jewish claimants in the early modern religion cases 
framed their claims to reflect majority, Protestant interests.177  Thus, 
even when minority religions win, they often do so because their 
interests align with majoritarian interests and values.178 
This preference for mainstream claims can be seen in the different 
outcomes of the Edina and the GeorgiaCarry.org cases.  In 
GeorgiaCarry.org, the court could find no justification for the claim that 
the law burdened any religious beliefs.179  The plaintiffs in Edina 
received a more sympathetic reception.  The court simply asserted that 
there was no doubt that the law burdened the plaintiffs’ religion, and the 
 
at 251 (non-Christian religions never win at the Supreme Court level); see also Feldman, 
Christian America, supra note 121, at 273 n.5 (arguing that potential non-Christian religion 
free exercise victories are “ambiguous”). 
176.  See Feldman, Religious Minorities, supra note 19, at 252 (“America is a 
predominantly Christian nation.  It therefore is not unreasonable to suppose that Christians 
should receive preferential treatment at the hands of the Court.  Christians probably are less 
likely to find that the exercise of their religion is burdened by laws in the first place.  Because 
of the majoritarian process, lawmakers are less likely to adopt laws that place burdens on 
adherents of Christianity, the majority religion.  If, however, Christians do find themselves in 
court defending the exercise of their religion, the judiciary is likely to be receptive to their 
claims.  Primarily, this is because Christian judges should be more likely to be sympathetic to 
the plight of fellow Christians.  The religious burden may appear more ‘substantial,’ or the 
governmental interests may seem less ‘compelling’ when they burden Christians than when 
they burden non-Christians.  Therefore, mainstream Christians should prevail more often 
than non-Christians in free exercise cases.” (quoting Brent, supra note 174, at 248)).  
177.  Id. at 249. 
178.  See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221, 225, 235 (1972) (noting approvingly 
that the Amish fell within a long tradition of self-reliance); see also Linda C. McClain, Against 
Agnosticism: Why the Liberal State Isn’t Just One (Authority) Among the Many, 93 B.U. L. 
REV. 1319, 1337 (2013) (“[T]here was a congruence between Amish values and venerated 
American values . . . .”).  Derek Bell pointed out a similar dynamic in school desegregation 
and civil rights cases.  See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).  This dynamic plays itself out in civil 
rights cases, too.  See id. at 524–25 (suggesting that African-American plaintiffs win when 
their interests coincide with the white majority); see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two 
Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE 
L.J. 470 (1976) (arguing that mainstream interests of lawyers took precedence over interests 
of community). 
179.  GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1258 (11th Cir. 2012).  
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state conceded the sincerity of the belief.180  It is not self-evident, 
however, what the burden actually was.  
The plaintiffs objected to two requirements: that they put up a sign 
with state-mandated wording to put people on notice of their no-gun 
policy and that they allow permit holders to have their guns on church 
parking lots.181  The churches noted their commitment to peace and non-
violence, but there was nothing in either regulation that interfered with 
these beliefs.182  Indeed, there was little in the law that interfered with 
their practices either.183  The churches’ prohibition on weapons 
continued unabated whether they were categorically exempt or if they 
posted notice.184  Minnesota’s law accommodated the rights of private 
establishments, a category that surely includes places of worship.185  
Declaring that guns were forbidden was an accurate statement of 
their religious beliefs,186 and by doing so, the law allowed them to 
continue their practices.  Similarly, the parking lot provision could only 
plausibly constitute a burden in those few times when the lot was used 
for religious practice.187  Even then, the guns would remain in vehicles 
and not be on any participant.  Moreover, as the court noted, public, on- 
and off-street parking was readily available.188  It would not be much 
more difficult for a person to gain access to a weapon in nearby on-
street parking as it would be in the church parking lot. 
The ease with which the court found this burden is consistent with 
the way courts treat claims by mainstream religions.189  Non-violence 
seems like a “natural” religious position.190  The presence of weapons, 
even in locked cars, suggests the possibility of violence.  Therefore, it 
 
180.  Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 203–208 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2008). 
181.  Id. at 202.  
182.  See id. 203. 
183.  Id. at 204–08. 
184.  See id. 
185.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(17)(b)(4)(d) (West 2009 & Supp. 2015).  Churches 
own an estimated $300 billion to $500 billion in untaxed church property.  Jeff Schweitzer, 
The Church of America, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 10, 2011, 3:49 PM), http://www.huffingtonp
ost.com/jeff-schweitzer/robert-jeffress-romney_b_1002753.html, (last updated Dec. 11, 2011, 
5:12 AM), archived at http://perma.cc/256E-4GM5.  
186.  See Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 200. 
187.  See id. at 206–07. 
188.  Id. at 209. 
189.  See supra notes 174–78 and accompanying text. 
190.  Kopel, Evolving Attitudes, supra note 20 (claiming that Western Christian churches 
moved toward pacifism during the twentieth century). 
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was “obvious” that the law burdened religion.  The GeorgiaCarry.org 
plaintiffs had to fight this perception.  They wanted their parishioners to 
be armed for their and the congregation’s protection,191 but this runs 
directly counter to the “natural” perception that religion and places of 
worship are refuges from violence.192  Yet places of worship are 
victimized by violence.193  Most faiths have developed theological 
justifications for the use of violence in certain circumstances.194 Thus, far 
from being in the mainstream, pacifism may be the exception for 
American religions.195 
Discerning a burden is a difficult task,196 but asking courts to find a 
burden on religion without inquiring into the religious basis for the 
 
191.  GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d at 1249 n.8. 
192.  See Edina, 745 N.W.2d at 199–200. 
193.  See, e.g., Whitman, supra note 12, at 1988–89; Shaila Dewan, Hate for Liberals and 
Gay People Drove Gunman, Police Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2008, at A15; Steven Yaccino, 
Michael Schwirtz & Marc Santora, Gunman Kills 6 at Sikh Temple Near Milwaukee, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2012, at A1; Hayley Mason & Nancy Amons, Woman Dies From Injuries in 
Cookeville Church Shooting, WSMV (Feb. 2, 2014, 11:48 AM), http://www.wsmv.com/story/24
612934/fatal-shooting-inside-cookeville-church, (last updated Mar. 2, 2014, 11:53 AM), 
archived at http://perma.cc/F3JS-KZ5E.  Indeed, the incidents near Milwaukee and Knoxville 
were cited by the federal government in 2013 when it released a guide to help houses of 
worship deal with active shooters.  See FEMA, GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING HIGH-QUALITY 
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLANS FOR HOUSES OF WORSHIP 23 (2013), available at 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/33007, archived at http://perma.cc/8VFS-
6W2U.  One of its recommendations is to fight back.  Id. at 30. (“If neither running nor hiding 
is a safe option, as a last resort, when confronted by the shooter, adults in immediate danger 
should consider trying to disrupt or incapacitate the shooter by using aggressive force and 
items in their environment, such as fire extinguishers or chairs.”).  The guide goes on to 
suggest that houses of worship should come up with “policies on the control and presence of 
weapons, as permitted by law.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
194.  See generally David B. Kopel, The Catholic Second Amendment, 29 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 519 (2006) (addressing, among other topics, the catechism and canon law on self-
defense and just war); David B. Kopel, The Torah and Self-Defense, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 17 
(2004) (discussing Jewish “teachings on the right to  . . . defend oneself and others”). 
195.  See, e.g., Kopel, Religious Roots, supra note 20 (religious sentiment at the founding 
saw self-defense as a sacred duty).  This does not contradict the claim that non-mainstream 
religions find it difficult to win free exercise cases.  See Feldman, Christian America, supra 
note 121.  This is not a theological or analytical process.  That is, courts do not investigate the 
theological or historical background of the claims in front of them.  Rather, they operate 
based on social and cultural assumptions about what is “normal” or “natural.”  That Western 
religions might justify the use of force is not at the forefront of the judicial mind.  Rather, the 
non-violence claims fall within a contemporary narrative of peaceful religion while the 
possession of weapons falls outside that narrative. 
196.  See Mark Tushnet, Heller and the Perils of Compromise, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 419, 425 & n.28 (2009) (comparing part of the analysis in Heller to discerning a burden 
in free exercise cases). 
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practice may be asking too much of them.  Judges are subject to the 
same cognitive, cultural and social biases as everyone else.197  “Religion” 
powerfully frames the issue and activates deep cognitive processes.  As 
Professor Krotoszynski notes, 
The very notion of “religion” triggers deep-seated, largely 
unconscious cultural associations and understandings.  To ask 
someone to characterize a particular group as a “religion” 
requires her to draw a material equivalency between the beliefs 
of the group in question and her own beliefs; if the equivalency 
seems unwarranted because of the bizarre nature of the group’s 
theology, she might well prove unwilling to accept that the other 
group is a legitimate “religion” in the same way as her own.  
“The attitude that most affects social and political behavior is 
prejudice against people who are different.”198 
When faced with ideas or behavior at odds with our own, cognitive 
dissonance results.199  We reduce that dissonance by removing the 
disagreeable idea or behavior.200  Because there is no legal definition of 
religion for free exercise purposes, a judge must subconsciously evaluate 
the authenticity of the claim and the claimant.201  An individual 
confronted with a religious belief that she views as unusual or bizarre 
may cause her to discount that belief and reaffirm her own.202  Judges 
 
197.  See Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of 
Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 491 (2004) (noting that the religion of the claimant, the judge, and the community are the 
most salient features of judicial decision making). 
198.  Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels: Religious Equality, Free 
Exercise, and the (Underappreciated) Merits of Smith, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1189, 1235 (2008) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting JOSEPH F. BYRNES, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION 151 
(1984)). 
199.  See generally PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, 
DECISION MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND 
POLICYMAKERS 366 (2010) (summarizing cognitive dissonance theory with references). 
200.  Id. 
201.  See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free 
Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 954 (1989) (“[T]he questioning of sincerity may 
operate invisibly and subconsciously against unknown or unpopular religions.  The more 
unusual a claimant’s religion, the easier it will be for decisionmakers to conclude, on the basis 
of an unarticulated view that ‘no one could really believe this,’ that the claimant’s beliefs are 
not sincerely held.”); Marshall, supra note 66, at 311 (“Minority belief systems—not majority 
belief systems—will bear the brunt of the definition and the sincerity inquiries.”). 
202.  See Krotoszynski, supra note 198, at 1235; see also Stephen M. Feldman, 
Empiricism, Religion, and Judicial Decision-Making, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 43, 47 
(2006) (“When tangible conflicts between social groups arise, the cohesion within each 
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who must decide if a neutral law burdens an “unusual or bizarre” belief 
will likely employ cognitively similar tactics.203  The decisions of the 
federal courts may reflect this process of dividing claims into acceptable 
and unacceptable religions.204  The result is that non-mainstream 
religions bring more and lose more free exercise cases than mainstream 
religions.205 
The very nature of religious claims makes them difficult to translate 
into contemporary legal categories.206  The translation process sanitizes 
them or leaves them impossible to understand by a “rational” and 
 
respective group and the salience of the division between groups are both likely to 
increase.”); Ramzi Kassem, Implausible Realities: Iqbal’s Entrenchment of Majority Group 
Skepticism Towards Discrimination Claims, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1443, 1461–62 (2010) 
(stating that the federal bench is “remarkably homogenous” compared to general 
population). 
203.  Krotoszynski, supra note 198, at 1193 (“[P]ervasive social hostility to religions that 
maintain nontraditional belief systems leads judges to discount the relative importance of 
religiously motivated behavior that conflicts with a neutral law of general applicability; courts 
either find that the governmental policy in question does not “burden” the religion (or 
burdens it only indirectly) or, alternatively, find that the legislative goals advanced by the law 
actually advance a compelling interest in a narrowly tailored way.”).  “The decisions of the 
federal courts reflect the same sort of effort to classify religion into acceptable denominations 
verses unacceptable cults.”  Id. at 1241. 
204.  See id. at 1240–41.  
205.  Id. at 1244–45 (“The pattern is reasonably clear: minority religious groups bring far 
more cases than do more traditional majority religious groups.  But even though minority 
religionists bring far more cases, their success rate in the federal courts is much lower.  
Minority religionists bring and lose more cases; majority religionists bring fewer cases and win 
a larger percentage of them.” (footnotes omitted)); Marshall, supra note 66, at 311 (arguing 
that a negative outcome is more likely “when the religion is bizarre, relative to the cultural 
norm,” or “when the belief in question is, by cultural norms, incredulous”); Gregory C. Sisk & 
Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11: Empirical Evidence from the 
Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 231, 235 (2012) (noting that Muslims faced substantial 
disadvantage in religious liberty cases compared to other religious groups).  But see Gregory 
C. Sisk, How Traditional and Minority Religions Fare in the Courts: Empirical Evidence from 
Religious Liberty Cases, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 1021, 1036 (2005) (stating that the hypothesis 
that minority or unconventional religions are at a disadvantage in court is not supported by 
study’s data). 
206.  See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Enlightening the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 473, 478 (1996) (“For the faithful, the ultimate authority and source of truth is 
extrahuman, and evidence can—and in some religious traditions, must—be entirely personal 
to the individual; for the reasonable, both the source and the evidence for the truth lie in 
common human observation, experience, and reasoning.  To have faith is to affirm a 
transcendent reality, different from that observed by nonbelievers.”); see also Donald L. 
Beschle, Does a Broad Free Exercise Right Require a Narrow Definition of “Religion”?, 39 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 357 (2011) (arguing that modern religious diversity necessitates an 
expansive definition of religion). 
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“objective” analysis.207  In a world that has long since declared God’s 
death, claims of religious truth and obligation fail to resonate.208  As 
Professor Paulsen argues, true religious claims are different from other 
obligations, however deeply felt. 
The nature of religious obligation is intrinsically different from 
philosophical or moral belief systems that involve no conception 
of a transcendent Creator, God.  The believer understands 
himself to be under the superior authority of God.  The ethical 
humanist, secularist, or atheist does not; he does not believe in 
God.  Rather, he is subject to the moral commands he discerns 
for himself.  (In a very real sense, the atheist is “God” for 
himself, the only ultimate authority over his own conscience.  He 
really is, in Smith’s words, “a law unto himself.”)209 
Religion not only assumes a command superior to the state’s, it also 
plays a central role in one’s identity.210  Perhaps, then, the only burdens 
the Free Exercise Clause should care about are those that leave the 
individual with a stark choice: violate the law or violate your religion.  
Courts should only protect those infringements that go to the heart of 
one’s religious practice and identity: where following one’s secular 
obligations is not merely inconvenient but fundamentally inconsistent 
with one’s religious principles.  Preventing Sikh children from taking 
their kirpan into schools is such a choice.211  It is not clear that 
preventing Baptists from taking their guns into their church service is 
 
207.  See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 
PEPP. L. REV. 1159 (2013). 
208.  See Michael W. McConnell, “God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!”: Freedom of 
Religion in the Post-Modern Age, 1993 BYU L. REV. 163; Paulsen, supra note 207. 
209.  Paulsen, supra note 207, at 1203 (quoting Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 
(1990)).  But see CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007). 
210.  Abner S. Greene, Constitutional Reductionism, Rawls, and the Religion Clauses, 72 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2089, 2091 (2004) (“Religion, on my argument, is different because it is 
based in an extrahuman source of normative authority.”).  But see HAMILTON, supra note 109 
(accommodating religion does not create more good than harm); LEITER, supra note 90, at 
32–36 (suggesting that there is no difference between identity and obligation); Micah 
Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1401 (2012) 
(“[R]eligion is not morally distinctive . . . .”). 
211.  “A religious dictate . . . is more than a question of identity; it is a duty.”  Michael 
W. McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 YALE L.J. 770, 799–800 (2013) 
[hereinafter McConnell, Why Protect] (reviewing LEITER, supra note 90) (discussing Brian 
Leiter’s comparison of a Sikh child’s religious obligation to carry the kirpan and a rural 
child’s conscientious desire to carry a pocket knife); see also LEITER, supra note 90, at 1–3. 
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the same thing.212  Yet such a harsh standard would involve the courts 
even more deeply in purely religious questions,213 carve out a huge space 
for government to occupy in the lives of citizens,214 and ultimately 
devalue the role of religious belief in an individual’s life.215 
B. The Exemption Problem  
Second, these cases are part of the larger debate about how easy it 
should be to get religious exemptions from general laws.216  Too easy 
 
212.  See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 90, 1–3 (comparing a rural boy who receives a pocket 
knife as a rite of passage and the Sikh boy who carries the kirpan as part of his religious 
identity). 
213.  See Smith, 494 U.S. at 886–87 (stating that courts must not determine the 
importance or the plausibility of religious claims); Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 
(1989) (noting that centrality of religious belief not for judiciary to decide); Thomas v. 
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (“Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.”). 
214.  Hamilton notes the increasing libertarianism of modern day free exercise 
jurisprudence.  See HAMILTON, supra note 109, at 206.  Some scholars have argued that 
modern Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence is about protection of individual autonomy.  See, 
e.g., Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. 
REV. 9, 93 (2004).  Others claim that this modern focus is misplaced and that equality of 
religion (or conscience) is the correct focus of the Free Exercise Clause.  See, e.g., Bret Boyce, 
Equality and the Free Exercise of Religion, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 493, 552 (2009) (“The free 
exercise of religion requires equal and impartial treatment of all regardless of their beliefs, 
not a patchwork of special privileges, favors, and exemptions.”); Christopher L. Eisgruber & 
Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting 
Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245 (1994); William P. Marshall, What is the Matter 
with Equality?: An Assessment of the Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 193, 194 (2000) (stating that equality serves as a 
“center of gravity, assuring that the constitutional status of religion does not veer too far in 
any one direction”). 
215.  See Laycock, Religious Exemption, supra note 69, at 176 (noting that without 
exemptions the right to believe is “hollow”). 
216.  See, e.g., ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES 
OF AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 3–4 (2012) (suggesting that broad exemptions 
are necessary to accommodate plural authorities); Abner S. Greene, Civil Society and 
Multiple Repositories of Power, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 477 (1999) (explaining that the 
pluralist understanding of authority is more compatible with constitutional order).  Compare 
McConnell, Why Protect, supra note 211 (arguing for constitutional religious exemptions on 
originalist grounds), with Philip Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: 
An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 916–17 (1992) (arguing against 
religious exemptions on originalist grounds), and Schwartzman, supra note 210, at 1406 
(stating that there is no consensus among originalists on the issue of free exercise 
exemptions).  But see Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable 
Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555, 574 (1998) 
(concluding there is no plausible explanation of why only religious believers are 
constitutionally entitled to exemptions from general laws); McClain, supra note 178 
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acceptance of religious claims would cause unnecessary expense and 
enforcement difficulties even, perhaps, chaos.217  Too stingy an approach 
and religious freedom becomes an empty promise.218 
Two leading religion clause scholars, Professors Marci Hamilton and 
Douglas Laycock, recently engaged in a sometimes vitriolic debate on 
this issue.219  Hamilton argues that we should be wary of granting 
religious exemptions from general laws because religions have caused 
significant social harm.220  Judicially crafted exemptions through the 
Free Exercise Clause allow courts, which are not equipped to deal with 
weighing of complex social and cultural factors, to pick and choose 
social and political winners and losers.221  Exemptions should only be 
given by legislatures on a case-by-case basis when no significant harm to 
others will result. 
Exempting religious conduct from neutral, general laws must be 
(1) duly enacted by a legislature, not decreed by a court; (2) must 
be debated under the harsh glare of public scrutiny; and (3) must 
be consistent with the larger public good.  Where the burden on 
religious conduct can be lifted by the legislature with only de 
minimis harm to the public, there is good reason to 
accommodate the religious conduct.222  
Laycock critiques this position in a no-holds-barred book review.223  
He calls it a “dreadful book” and most of it a “poorly executed rant—
 
(suggesting that broad exemptions may undermine state’s interest in equality and in 
protecting children). 
217.  See Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 (suggesting that broad exemptions would be “courting 
anarchy”); LEITER, supra note 90, at 94 (noting that broad exemptions could be something 
like “anarchy”); see also, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) 
(involving a for-profit company that objected to four of twenty contraceptive methods 
required to be included in health insurance plan). 
218.  Laycock, Religious Exemption, supra note 69, at 176 (“Regulatory exemptions are 
an essential part of meaningful religious liberty.  The right to believe a religion is hollow 
without the right to practice the religion; it leaves committed believers subject to persecution 
for exercising their religion.”). 
219.  Marci A. Hamilton, A Response to Professor Laycock, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1189 
(2007); Douglas Laycock, God vs. the Gavel: A Brief Rejoinder, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1545 
(2007); Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1169 (2007) [hereinafter 
Laycock, Syllabus of Errors] (reviewing HAMILTON, supra note 109). 
220.  HAMILTON, supra note 109, at 274 (“[R]eligious entities can be responsible for 
lethal medical neglect of children, childhood sexual abuse, [and] the takeover of neighboring 
property owner’s rights under the zoning laws, . . . among other conduct.”). 
221.  See id. at 275. 
222.  Id. 
223.  See Laycock, Syllabus of Errors, supra note 219. 
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disorganized, self-contradictory, and riddled with errors.”224  Laycock 
charges that Hamilton accuses courts for being overly sensitive to 
religious claims while ignoring the same thing in legislatures.225  To 
Laycock, judicially crafted exemptions can protect religious freedom.226  
Judges are removed from politics and, thus, less likely to be swayed by 
political influence.227  This distance also allows judges to more carefully 
sift facts and evaluate claims.228 
This debate about the proper institution to grant exemptions is only 
a symptom of their more fundamental disagreement.  Hamilton fears 
religion’s influence in modern society, while Laycock is agnostic.229  
Hamilton’s calculus leads her to the conclusion that broad religious 
exemptions cause more harm than good.230  No group, religious or not, 
 
224.  Id. at 1169. 
225.  Id. at 1173 (“Legislators have exempted harmful religious behavior that no judge 
would ever exempt under a generally applicable standard—most notably, parents refusing to 
provide medical care for their children.”). 
226.  See id. at 1177 (“Hamilton’s examples show that judges are less likely to grant 
foolish exemptions that result in serious harm.  Judges sometimes are willing to protect 
unpopular minorities, but legislators hardly ever; legislators cannot afford to protect any 
group that is seriously unpopular with voters.”); see also Michael J. Perry, Freedom of 
Religion in the United States: Fin de Siècle Sketches, 75 IND. L.J. 295, 306 (2000) (“The 
fundamental question here, I think, is twofold: How skeptical of ordinary politics, how 
distrustful, ought we to be when it comes to the protection of religious minorities?  And how 
vigorously ought we to want the judiciary to protect, against discrimination, religious 
minorities and their religious practice?  My answer to the first question: very skeptically.  My 
answer to the second: very vigorously.”). 
227.  See Laycock, Syllabus of Errors, supra note 219, at 117–77.  He uses the federal 
courts as examples, however, and does not explain how this insulation would operate in 
jurisdictions that elect their judges.  See id.  Recent state judicial elections show that decisions 
with religious and cultural overtones can have serious repercussions for elected judges.  For 
example, three Iowa Supreme Court justices lost their retention elections after an aggressive 
campaign against their support of a ruling striking down Iowa’s ban on same-sex marriages.  
Grant Schulte, Iowans Dismiss Three Justices, DES MOINES REG. (Nov. 3, 2010),  http://www.
desmoinesregister.com/article/20101103/NEWS09/11030390/Iowans-dismiss-three-justices?ncl
ick_check=1, archived at http://perma.cc/2X2W-SX4X. 
228.  Laycock, Syllabus of Errors, supra note 159, at 1175–77. 
229.  Compare HAMILTON, supra note 109, at 3 (“The purpose of this book is to 
persuade Americans to take off the rose-colored glasses and to come to terms with the 
necessity of making religious individuals and institutions accountable to the law so that they 
do not harm others.”), with Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty As Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 313, 314, 353 (1996) [hereinafter Laycock, Religious Liberty] (“Religious 
liberty does not view religion as a good thing to be promoted, nor as a dangerous force to be 
contained.  But people who view religion in each of these ways struggle to capture the 
Religion Clauses for their side.”). 
230.  HAMILTON, supra note 109, at 8 (stating that exemptions should only be granted 
when “immunizing religious conduct is consistent with public welfare, health, and safety”).  
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should be allowed to cause harm to the broader society.231  Laycock 
reaches a different conclusion.232  Protecting religious freedom is 
important and necessary because (1) the Constitution says we should; 
(2) religion is a deeply held, fundamental belief for many people; and 
(3) without broad judicially crafted exemptions, religion can become a 
divisive force in ordinary politics.233  
If all it takes to gain an exemption is to wrap religion around a 
personal or political position, then everyone will be a “law unto 
themselves.”234  Without some limiting principle to filter claims,235 the 
Free Exercise Clause will either swallow up the rest of the Constitution 
or be emptied of content.236  Hamilton and Laycock demonstrate, 
however, that discerning the correct principle will not be easy.  
 
Id. at 304 (“[This] approach . . . is consistent with the high ideal of republicanism—to yield 
the greatest good possible for the people.”).  She is not alone in her skepticism.  See, e.g., 
Gedicks, supra note 216, at 574 (“There no longer exists a plausible explanation of why 
religious believers—and only believers—are constitutionally entitled to be excused from 
complying with otherwise legitimate laws that burden practices motivated by moral belief.”); 
Sherry, supra note 206, at 495 (“[T]he government may not single out any irrational beliefs 
for preferential treatment, nor is it required to treat alternative epistemologies as favorably as 
Enlightenment rationality. . . . To do otherwise is for the government to accept as true the 
claims of particular religious believers—a course of action that is dangerous to government 
and religion alike . . . .”). 
231.  See HAMILTON, supra note 109, at 303 (“The rule of law is diminished when 
individuals may use their personal beliefs to avoid the law and to harm others.”). 
232.  See Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 229, at 319 (“[R]eligion is to be left as 
wholly to private choice and private commitment as anything can be.”). 
233.  Id. at 317. 
234.  See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (“‘Laws,’ we said, ‘are made for 
the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and 
opinions, they may with practices. . . .  Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because 
of his religious belief?  To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious 
belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law 
unto himself.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–
67 (1878))). 
235.  See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 90, at 94 (arguing that there is no principled way to 
distinguish religious exemptions from other claims of conscience); Angela C. Carmella, 
Responsible Freedom Under The Religion Clauses: Exemptions, Legal Pluralism, and the 
Common Good, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 403, 409 (2007) (arguing that the question of exemptions 
requires normative judgment about their contribution to the common good). 
236.  See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 90, at 94–98 (arguing that an exemption regime either 
would constitutionalize civil disobedience or would lead to unfair exclusions); Carmella, supra 
note 235, at 409 (stating that an alternative to normative judgment would be to create 
“absolute religious freedom or to impose only the state’s legal norms”). 
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C. The Neutrality Problem 
Third, the gun cases relate to what it means to be “neutral” as to 
religion.  Courts use neutrality as the talisman of religion clause 
jurisprudence without explaining what being neutral really means.237  
Douglas Laycock has argued that instead of a single concept called 
“neutrality,” there are three different ways that laws can be neutral as to 
religion.238  He distinguishes between formal neutrality, substantive 
neutrality, and disaggregated neutrality.239  Formal neutrality requires 
the government to use neutral categories.240 Substantive neutrality 
requires the government to use neutral incentives.241  Laycock uses the 
example of a ban on children drinking alcohol.242  The ban is formally 
neutral because it does not use religion as a defining category.243  Like 
the statutes in the opt-out jurisdictions, it applies to everyone regardless 
 
237.  See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994); Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(laws must be neutral and generally applicable); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & 
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792 (1973); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 
(1970); see also Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 51, 56 
(2007) [hereinafter Laycock, Substantive Neutrality] (stating that the Supreme Court has been 
“notoriously inconsistent” with neutrality); R. George Wright, Can We Make Sense of 
“Neutrality” in the Religion Clause Cases?: Seven Rescue Attempts and a Viable Alternative, 65 
SMU L. REV. 877, 878–79 nn.1–2 (2012) (comprehensive listing of federal courts’ use of 
neutrality). 
238.  Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward 
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 999–1011 (1990) [hereinafter Laycock, Neutrality Toward 
Religion]; see Laycock, Substantive Neutrality, supra note 237, at 52; see also Andrew 
Koppelman, And I Don’t Care What It Is: Religious Neutrality in American Law, 39 PEPP. L. 
REV. 1115 (2013) (arguing that neutrality is a master concept that operates in slightly 
different ways in different contexts.).  But see Chad Flanders, Can We Please Stop Talking 
About Neutrality? Koppelman Between Scalia and Rawls, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1139, 1147 (2013) 
(“We are better off, I think, giving up on neutrality as a term of art and simply arguing 
directly in terms of religion’s distinct value: we protect religion not because we are being 
neutral, but because of the value of religion as such.”). 
239.  Laycock, Neutrality Toward Religion, supra note 238, at 999–1011. 
240.  Laycock, Substantive Neutrality, supra note 237, at 54 (“Formal neutrality requires 
neutral categories.  A law is formally neutral if it does not use religion as a category—if 
religious and secular examples of the same phenomenon are treated exactly the same.”). 
241.  Id. at 54–55 (“Substantive neutrality requires neutral incentives.  A law is 
substantively neutral if it neither ‘encourages [n]or discourages religious belief or disbelief, 
practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Laycock, Neutrality Toward Religion, supra note 238, at 1001)).  
242.  Id. at 55. 
243.  Id. 
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of religious or secular status.244  But it would be proper for states to 
make exceptions for such practices (or, at least, look the other way): 
[A]n exception that permits children to take communion wine is 
substantively neutral.  Exempting communion wine from the ban 
on under-age consumption of alcohol is extraordinarily unlikely 
to induce anyone to become a Christian, to join a denomination 
that uses real wine in its communion service, or to attend 
communion services more often—unless that person already 
desired to do these things but had been deterred by the threat of 
government-imposed penalties.  Consuming communion wine is 
a desirable activity only to those who already believe in the 
religious teaching that gives meaning to the act.  Forbidding 
children to take communion wine, or criminally punishing their 
parents and the priest who gives them the sacrament, powerfully 
discourages an act of worship.  But exemption does not 
encourage any child to take communion, or any parent to take 
his child to a communion service, who is not already religiously 
motivated do so.  An exemption does not change anyone’s 
religious incentives; criminalization changes those incentives 
profoundly.245 
Categorical jurisdictions explicitly use religion to set houses of 
worship apart from most private property owners.246  Apparently, 
houses of worship are thought to be like other public or government 
buildings.  If so, then these laws are formally neutral because “religious 
and secular examples of the same phenomenon” are treated alike.247 On 
the surface, that appears true.  On closer inspection, however, this 
exclusion seems to flow from assumptions about the naturalness or 
reasonableness of religious claims.248  
At the same time, opt-out jurisdictions are substantively neutral 
because they allow property owners, including houses of worship, to 
exclude guns from their property upon compliance with the statutory 
 
244.  See Laycock, Substantive Neutrality, supra note 237, at 55 (“[F]orbidding children 
to take communion wine is formally neutral.  Children cannot consume alcoholic beverages in 
any amount for any purpose.  Religion is not a category in the formulation or application of 
this rule; alcohol is forbidden to children whether for religious purposes or secular 
purposes.”); supra note 14. 
245.  Laycock, Substantive Neutrality, supra note 237, at 55 (emphasis added). 
246.  E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127(b) (2011 & Supp. 2013). 
247.  See Laycock, Substantive Neutrality, supra note 237, at 54. 
248.  See supra notes 189–95 and accompanying text. 
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requirements.249  Here the law is formally neutral on its face but 
substantively neutral in its application.  Under this categorization, 
however, the cases should have been analyzed in a different way.  The 
substantively neutral restrictions of Minnesota’s opt-out law was found 
to burden religion and was subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis because 
it seemed that the religious claim was more reasonable.250  Georgia’s 
categorical ban lacked formal neutrality (and for that matter, 
substantive neutrality as well) but was not found to even burden 
religion.251  In Laycock’s terms, the categorical ban served to 
“discourage[] religious . . . practice . . . [or] observance.”252  
Perhaps searching for neutrality is a fool’s errand.  As Steven Smith 
noted, 
[T]he quest for neutrality, despite its understandable appeal and 
the tenacity with which it has been pursued, is an attempt to 
grasp at an illusion.  Upon reflection, this failure should not be 
surprising.  The impossibility of a truly “neutral” theory of 
religious freedom is analogous to the impossibility, recognized by 
modern philosophers, of finding some outside Archimedean 
point . . . from which to look down on and describe reality.  
Descriptions of reality are always undertaken from a point 
within reality.  In the same way, theories of religious freedom are 
always offered from the viewpoint of one of the competing 
positions that generate the need for such a theory; there is no 
neutral vantage point that can permit the theorist or judge to 
transcend these competing positions.253 
The gun cases show how difficult it is to find a “neutral” vantage 
point from which to view religion cases.  The result is that courts will 
avoid the actual right at issue and rely on background assumptions 
about religion and neutrality.254  Perhaps the very nature of religious 
 
249.  See supra note 14.  
250.  See Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. Minnesota, 745 N.W.2d 194, 203–211 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2008). 
251.  See GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d, 1244, 1255–56 (11th Cir. 2012).  
The court seemed to conflate the burden question with the question about the neutrality of 
the law.  
252.  Laycock, Neutrality Toward Religion, supra note 238, at 1001, quoted in Laycock, 
Substantive Neutrality, supra note 237, at 54–55. 
253.  STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 96–97 (1995). 
254.  See supra notes 189–95 and accompanying text; see also Frank S. Ravitch, Rights 
and the Religion Clauses, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 91 (2008) (arguing that the 
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claims makes them difficult, if not impossible, to translate into legal 
categories.255  They are either impossible to understand by a “rational” 
and “objective” analysis or sanitized, tamed, or corrupted.256 Moreover, 
particularistic religious claims for exemptions do not co-exist well in an 
increasingly diverse and non-religious country.257  Finding a neutral 
vantage point in such difficult terrain seems unlikely.258  
VIII. CONCLUSION: WHAT’S FREE EXERCISE FOR? 
These three issues share a common core: what is the purpose of the 
Free Exercise Clause, what functions does it serve, historically and 
today, and what should it protect.  Modern law focuses on protecting the 
autonomy of the individual believer.259  The Free Exercise Clause, 
perhaps like the Free Speech Clause, allows the individual to forge a 
personal identity free from government compulsion.260   Under this 
 
Supreme Court’s shift to formal neutrality has shifted religion clause doctrine from protecting 
minority religions to preserving majority religions’ political and social dominance).  But see 
Sisk, supra note 205, at 1036 (stating that majority religion claimants have no advantage in 
religion clause cases).   
255.  See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Is Religion Special? A Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, 1994 
U. ILL. L. REV. 535, 540 [hereinafter Greene, Is Religion Special?] (“[R]eligion self-
consciously revels in the unsensible, whereas science and other sources from which people 
make arguments at least purport to rely solely on the observable, on what we share as 
humans.”). 
256.  See supra notes 206–09 and accompanying text. 
257.  See THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 
SURVEY 1 (2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-st
udy-full.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UY8Z-NEJ5. 
258.  See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in Terms of Liberty, 
Equality, and Free Speech Values—A Critical Analysis of “Neutrality Theory” and Charitable 
Choice, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 243, 247 (1999) (maintaining that 
neutrality theory is not neutral); Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to 
Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489, 
493 (2004) (“Claims of neutrality cannot be proven.  There is no independent neutral truth or 
baseline to which they can be tethered.”); Wright, supra note 237, at 905 (concluding that 
claims of neutrality are “incoherent” and there is no way to “reinterpret, rehabilitate, or 
otherwise rescue the idea of neutrality in the Religion Clause context”). 
259.  See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 214, at 93 (“The Free Exercise Clause is supported by 
seven values: (1) it protects liberty and autonomy; (2) it avoids the cruelty of forcing an 
individual to do what he or she is conscientiously obliged not to do or to penalize an 
individual for responding to an obligation of conscience; (3) it preserves respect for law and 
minimizes violence triggered by religious conflict; (4) it combats religious discrimination; (5) it 
protects associational values; (6) it promotes political community; and (7) it protects the 
personal and social importance of religion.” (footnotes omitted)).  
260.  Alan E. Brownstein, Justifying Free Exercise Rights, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 504, 548 
(2003); William P. Marshall, Religion As Ideas: Religion As Identity, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
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reading, it is agnostic (pun intended) as to the value of religion.  Indeed, 
it extends to non-religion the protections of the “religion” clauses.261  On 
the other hand, some scholars argue that the modern focus on autonomy 
is misplaced.262  The focus on autonomy, along with its attendant secular 
virtues, ignores the real motivation for religious belief and practice. 
Ultimately, current justifications of religious freedom fail 
because they do not take religion seriously on its own terms.  No 
Muslim believes that he should make a pilgrimage to Mecca to 
raise the general level of civic virtue.  He does it because his faith 
that there is no God but Allah and that Mohammed is his 
Prophet teaches that only by completing the hadj can he qualify 
for entry into paradise.  Likewise, Orthodox Jews are not 
interested in creating mediating institutions but in faithfully 
fulfilling the conditions of the covenant God made with Moses 
and Israel on Mount Sinai.  Buddhist temples are not factories for 
the production of social capital but places where people attempt 
to follow the example of Buddha to nirvana.  Christian churches 
are not components of some philosophy of the “secular public 
realm” but meetings of “fellow citizens with the saints, and of the 
household of God” seeking salvation through Jesus Christ the 
Son of God. In short, the current arguments generally offered in 
favor of religious liberty have nothing to do with the ultimate 
concerns that are at the heart of religious belief.  They simply do 
not take such concerns seriously.263 
 
ISSUES 385, 406 (1996) (concluding that religion is a set of ideas and constitutive of personal 
identity); David B. Salmons, Toward a Fuller Understanding of Religious Exercise: 
Recognizing the Identity-Generative and Expressive Nature of Religious Devotion, 62 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1243, 1258 (1995); Greene, Is Religion Special?, supra note 256, at 536–37.  But see 
McClain, supra note 178. 
261.  See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970) (holding that purely ethical or 
moral beliefs that impose a duty of conscience qualify for religious exemption for military 
draft); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165–66 (1965) (holding that “sincere and 
meaningful” belief that holds same place as conventional religious belief satisfies statutory 
requirement for conscientious objector status). 
262.  See, e.g., John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedom, 7 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 275, 280 (1996) (stating that autonomy cannot explain complexity 
of religious liberty law); David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious 
Liberty, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (1991) (arguing that volitional assumptions limit proper 
reach of the Free Exercise Clause). 
263.  Note, Wagering on Religious Liberty, 116 HARV. L. REV. 946, 950–51 (2003) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Ephesians 2:19 (King James)). 
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Under this reading, the Framers were not agnostic (in either sense) 
about the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause.  They wanted to protect 
religion.264  As Michael Stokes Paulsen puts it:  
The Free Exercise Clause only makes sense on the assumption 
that God exists; that God makes claims on the loyalty of human 
beings; and that these claims are prior to and superior in 
obligation to the claims of the State.  The Clause thus embodies 
an essentially religious premise.265 
The Framers intended to create legal equality among all religions 
and protect those actions that flowed from a religious premise.266 To do 
otherwise renders the religion clauses incoherent because it ends up 
protecting purely secular behavior:  
If the Free Exercise Clause . . . confer[s] a sphere of immunity 
from facially neutral government regulation, then the “exercise” 
of atheism, agnosticism, skepticism, rationalism, humanism, and 
secularism indeed confers a huge area of exemption from 
government laws.  And it is a zone of exemption having, really, 
nothing much to do with religion.  It is secular freedom—
autonomy in general—treated as on par with religion, because it 
is religion’s complement, secular analog, or even opposite.267  
Members of each camp sometimes reach the same conclusion about 
how strong the Free Exercise Clause should be.268  Michael Stokes 
Paulsen puts the case thusly: 
[W]e protect religious liberty because religion is important—or, 
as I would refine it, because God exists and His claims are of 
 
264.  McConnell, Why Protect, supra note 211, at 777–81 (the Framers intended religious 
exemptions).  But see Hamburger, supra note 216, at 932 (stating that there is little evidence 
the Framers intended broad religious exemptions). 
265.  Michael Stokes Paulsen, God Is Great, Garvey Is Good: Making Sense of Religious 
Freedom, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1597, 1598 (1997) [hereinafter Paulsen, God Is Great]. 
266.  McConnell, Why Protect, supra note 211, at 777–81, 808. 
267.  Paulsen, God Is Great, supra note 265, at 1603. 
268.  Compare Paulsen, God Is Great, supra note 265, at 1610 (“Accordingly, the Free 
Exercise Clause confers an area of substantive immunity from government regulation that 
interferes with religious belief and exercise.  We prefer the sincere individual’s claim of 
religious conscience to the government’s claim of secular authority, absent an extraordinary 
showing of insincere religion or of a threat to state interests of the highest order.”), with 
Laycock, Religious Exemptions, supra note 69, at 176 (“Regulatory exemptions are an 
essential part of meaningful religious liberty.  The right to believe a religion is hollow without 
the right to practice the religion; it leaves committed believers subject to persecution for 
exercising their religion.”).  
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prior and greater obligation than those of the state—we should 
protect only those religions whose beliefs and commands we 
understand to fall within the acceptable range of having a 
plausible claim to be True Beliefs.  In fact, however, we protect 
much more, including a considerable amount of what even 
religious people view as religious rubbish.  We do so because we 
do not trust political majorities, and we certainly do not trust 
government agents, to distinguish Truth from Rubbish and 
because it is exceedingly difficult (and dangerous) to try to draft 
a religious freedom rule that successfully draws such a line.  In 
short, we protect the core freedom because we believe it consists 
of something objectively important and true, and we adopt an 
overbroad prophylactic rule for the sake of protecting the core 
freedom.  At least, that was probably the original purpose of 
protecting religious freedom.269  
These conceptual issues merge in weapons cases.  Courts must 
decide whether or not a substantial burden on religion exists.  To get 
there, they must resolve the background questions of the Free Exercise 
Clause’s purpose and what should count as a “religious burden.”270  That 
they do so silently and unwittingly speaks volumes about the 
incoherency of contemporary free exercise law.  
 
269.  Paulsen, God Is Great, supra note 265, at 1606. 
270.  This dilemma repeated itself in the litigation over the Affordable Care Act.  
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding that a mandate in the 
Affordable Care Act requiring private businesses to provide insurance coverage for 
contraception violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Acts because it forced them to 
facilitate activities that violated their religious beliefs without sufficient justification).  Like 
the Georgia and Minnesota plaintiffs, the plaintiffs argued that simply complying with the law 
was a significant burden that could not be justified by any compelling government interest.  
Id. at 2764–67, 2780 (arguing that complying with law’s minimum insurance requirements 
burdened plaintiff’s religious beliefs).  Resolving these cases in favor of the plaintiffs, the 
Court had to first accept—on faith, as it were—that religious beliefs and not personal 
preferences undergirded these claims.  See id. at 2778–79; see also Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 
v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1141 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[W]hen the plaintiff drew a moral line 
between foundry and factory work, it was not the Court’s prerogative to determine whether 
the line he drew ‘was an unreasonable one.’” (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 
715 (1981)).  The religious nature of these claims may seem self-evident, but that is precisely 
the way that “natural” religious claims are always privileged.  Their claims are no more self-
evident than either the Edina Lutherans or Georgia Baptists claims were.  See 
GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012); Edina Cmty. Lutheran 
Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 203–08 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).  Imagine another set of 
plaintiffs claiming a religious obligation to provide contraception.  It is hard to picture courts 
so easily finding a burden in those cases.  Like the GeorgiaCarry.org plaintiffs, their claims 
would not seem “natural.” 
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These seemingly minor cases reveal how muddy and opaque free 
exercise law is.271  Courts decide cases without a clear conceptual or 
historical framework.  They silently measure the claim by the degree to 
which the claim seems compatible with their own experience, thus 
making free exercise law a reflection of their conceptions, fears, and 
assumptions about religion.  It is, as it were, that courts only “see 
through a glass, darkly.”272  We await the day when they can see directly. 
 
271.  Alan Brownstein, Why Conservatives, and Others, Have Trouble Supporting the 
Meaningful Enforcement of Free Exercise Rights, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 925 (2010) 
(American free exercise jurisprudence is “shallow”). 
272.  1 Corinthians 13:12 (King James).  Paul described how difficult it is for human 
beings to comprehend things that could not be directly grasped by our current experience 
which the King James version poetically and beautifully translated as “through a glass, 
darkly.”  Id.  This notion is expressed more directly in some modern translations.  See, e.g., 1 
Corinthians 13:12 (New Living) (“Now we see things imperfectly as in a poor mirror.”).  
Other translations are available at Compare Translations for 1 Corinthians 13:12, BIBLE 
STUDY TOOLS (last visited Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.biblestudytools.com/1-corinthians/13-
12-compare.html, archived at http://perma.cc/AH4V-236R. 
